Risk-taking incentives predict aggression heuristics in female gorillas
Nikolaos Smit, Martha M Robbins
eLife · 2025
doi:10.7554/elife.107093 (opens in a new tab)
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Abstract
Competition is commonly reflected in aggressive interactions among groupmates as individuals try to attain or maintain higher social ranks that can offer them better access to critical resources. In this study, we investigate the factors that can shift competitive incentives against higher- or lower-ranking groupmates, that is, more or less powerful individuals. We use a long-term behavioural data set on five wild groups of the two gorilla species starting in 1998, and we show that most aggression is directed from higher- to lower-ranking adult females close in rank, highlighting rank-reinforcement incentives. Yet, females directed 42% of aggression to higher-ranking females than themselves. Females targeted groupmates of higher rank with increasing number of males in the group, suggesting that males might buffer female–female aggression risk. Contrarily, they targeted females of lower rank with increasing number of females in the group, potentially because this is a low-risk option that females prefer when they have access to a larger pool of competitors to choose from. Lactating and pregnant females, especially those in the latest stage of pregnancy, targeted groupmates of higher rank than the groupmates that cycling females targeted, suggesting that energetic needs may motivate females to risk confrontation with more powerful rivals. Our study provides critical insights into the evolution of competitive behaviour, showing that aggression heuristics, the simple rules that animals use to guide their aggressive interactions, are not merely species-specific but also dependent on the conditions that populations and individuals experience.
Abstract licence: CC BY
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