LEGAL SANCTIONS IN THE INCENTIVE STRUCTURE OF ECONOMIC AGENTS FOR PROTECTION OF THE WORKING ENVIRONMENT
Benjamin Miranda Tabak, André Vinicius Melatti
Revista Eletrônica do Curso de Direito da UFSM · 2018
doi:10.5902/1981369427743 (opens in a new tab)
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Abstract
The article proposes to analyze the key legal sanctions to which economic agents that degrade the working environment are subjected and how said sanctions influence the incentive structure in the adoption of behaviors that aim to protect the life, health and safety of workers. The paper further covers civil liability institutes that focus on labor areas, highlighting Supreme Court decisions over the matter and analyzes the efficiency of coercive fines fixed in the Conduct Adjustment Agreement signed by the Ministry of Labor, focusing on instruments provided by the economic analysis of law. The article develops the hypothesis of the need for economic enterprise sustainability in order to prevent negative externalities that affect the social and environmental dimensions of the worker’s human dignity and also costs with reparation payments and coercive fines arising from damages in the working environment.
Abstract licence: CC BY-NC-ND
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