Central Bank’s autonomy: legitimacy of macro-economic policy in Lula’s first mandate before bankers.
Rodolfo Dias
Mediações: Revista de Ciências Sociais · 2016
doi:10.5433/2176-6665.2016v21n1p360 (opens in a new tab)
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Abstract
The article analyzes the Central Bank’s autonomy policy pursued in Lula’s first mandate. The analysis is justified by the institution’s importance in the formulation of economic policies, and the need of institutional legitimacy by financial entrepreneurs, especially by banks. It is intended to observe the position of the bankers in that “bargaining game” that is established in the brazilian banking system. The research sources are the manifestations of bankers in press, specifically in the newspaper “Folha de São Paulo” and “Valor Econômico”. Two topics will be discussed in the article: Henrique Meirelles as president of the Central Bank; and the amendment of Article 192 of the 1988 Constitution. Is perceived that the demanding agenda of the bankers has not fully complied with (institutionalization of autonomy), but this did not imply a criticism ofgovernment policy.
Abstract licence: CC BY
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