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Did the R2P Foster Violence in Libya?

Alan Kuperman

Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal · 2019

doi:10.5038/1911-9933.13.2.1705 (opens in a new tab)

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Abstract

In the early 1990s, the relationship between genocidal violence and international humanitarian intervention was understood simplistically.Such intervention was viewed as always a response to, and never a cause of, inter-group violence.Well-intentioned intervention was expected reliably to reduce harm to civilians.Thus, the only obstacle to saving lives was believed to be inadequate political will for intervention.This quaint notion was popularized in mass-market books, 1 and it later gave rise to the "Responsibility to Protect" norm. 2 By the mid-1990s, however, scholars had discovered that the causal relationship between intervention and genocidal violence was more complicated.The prospect of intervention sometimes incentivized violence by parties expecting to attract intervention to help their side in a domestic struggle.For example, a relatively weak faction might launch a rebellion or armed secession to provoke a government crackdown, in hopes of triggering intervention to help them achieve independence or control of the state.Since the late 1990s, I have labeled this dynamic the "moral hazard of humanitarian intervention," 3 because the prospect of intervention is analogous to an imperfect insurance policy.It may backfire by encouraging irresponsible or fraudulent risk-taking, thereby increasing the likelihood of the negative outcome that the insurance was intended to avert.My publications have documented this dynamic in several cases, including Bosnia, Kosovo, and Darfur.4 Timothy Crawford rightly calls for specifying clearly the cause and effect of moral hazard in each case.5 The cause could be a diffuse norm of intervention, or previous intervention in a related instance, or a specific call for intervention in an ongoing situation.The effect could be the initiation of rebellion, or the escalation or perpetuation of an ongoing rebellion that otherwise might subside.The moral hazard of humanitarian intervention is not responsible for all initiation, escalation, and perpetuation of rebellion.Nor is rebellion the cause of all state violence against civilians.However, moral hazard has been demonstrated in several cases to incentivize rebellion and thereby foster escalatory violence that harms non-combatants.The scope of this pathology must be investigated to inform a rational reassessment and potential reform of the R2P.Accordingly, this article examines what role if any the moral hazard of humanitarian intervention played in Libya's 2011 rebellion that resulted in widespread and persistent suffering of civilians.

Abstract licence: CC BY-NC

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