Skip to content
naulon
Not checkedNot checked for notices yet.

Statistical foundations of ecological rationality

Brighton Henry

Economics: Journal Articles · 2020

doi:10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2020-2 (opens in a new tab)

We email you when a new notice or a question about this paper appears.

Abstract

If we reassess the rationality question under the assumption that the uncertainty of the natural world is largely unquantifiable, where do we end up? In this article the author argues that we arrive at a statistical, normative, and cognitive theory of ecological rationality. The main casualty of this rebuilding process is optimality. Once we view optimality as a formal implication of quantified uncertainty rather than an ecologically meaningful objective, the rationality question shifts from being axiomatic/probabilistic in nature to being algorithmic/predictive in nature. These distinct views on rationality mirror fundamental and longstanding divisions in statistics

Abstract licence: CC BY

Reads

Read by people on this page

None yet.

Checked or read by AI through naulon

None yet.

A person counts once a day per paper. We keep no cookie and no address: a reader is a hash that changes every day. Any month under five reads shows no number.

Are you an author?

Is this your paper?

Claim it to add your note and be paid when agents cite it. Free.