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Overview of bribery giving behaviors: Determinants and influence on firm performance
Vu Thi Hong Nhung, Nguyen Thi Hong Huong
Ho Chi Minh City Open University Journal of Science - Economics and Business Administration · 2022
doi:10.46223/hcmcoujs.econ.en.12.1.1953.2022 (opens in a new tab)
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Abstract
Using findings on existing literature from 1986 to 2020, this paper provides an overview on understanding the theories, the determinants to explain bribery offering behavior, and the influence of paying bribes on firm performance. Based on our knowledge, we have found that there are three common theories including principal agent, residual control right and bargaining power theories that researchers have used to understand the motivation of paying bribes. Extant studies have shown supportive evidence that alongside business environment, both firm factors and business owner and manager characteristics have significant effects on a decision of paying bribes. Firms with high vulnerable exposure, such as young firms, firms with small and medium sizes, firms depending much on public services, or service firms, are more likely to pay bribes than others. Previous studies show both positive and negative effects of paying bribes on firm performance. However, vulnerable firms seem not to get many benefits when employing bribe payments.
Abstract licence: CC BY-NC
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