Russell And Frege On The Logic of Functions
Bernard Linsky
The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication · 2009
doi:10.4148/biyclc.v4i0.133 (opens in a new tab)
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Abstract
I compare Russell&rsquo;s theory of mathematical functions, the &ldquo;descriptive functions&rdquo; from Principia Mathematica &lowast;30, with Frege&rsquo;s well known account of functions as &ldquo;unsaturated&rdquo; entities. Russell analyses functional terms with propositional functions and the theory of definite descriptions. This is the primary technical role of the theory of descriptions in P M. In Principles of Mathematics and some unpublished writings from before 1905, Russell offered explicit criticisms of Frege&rsquo;s account of functions. Consequenly, the theory of descriptions in &ldquo;On Denoting&rdquo; can be seen as a crucial part of Russell&rsquo;s larger logicist reduction of mathematics,aswellasanexcursionintothetheoryof reference. <br />
Abstract licence: CC BY-NC-ND
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