Perché l’intenzionalità collettiva non dà conto del mercato azionario e i documenti sì
Giuliano Torrengo
Rivista di Estetica · 2012
doi:10.4000/estetica.1482 (opens in a new tab)
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Abstract
The social world is populated by many entities, such as promises, contracts, presidents, money, debts, and financial crises. Many philosophers regard collective behaviour and attitudes as the ground of social reality. According to this standard view, social ontology is at bottom composed of collective intentions and cooperative behaviours, and that holds both for simple cases concerning small groups and complex institutional structures. In this paper, this view is challenged and an alternative approach is proposed in which the role of collective intentions and cooperative behaviour is very different in (a) small group cases, where it can be seen as the ground of social roles and obligations, and (b) cases concerning complex institutions, in which documents and records of social acts in general are the ground that determines rights, duties, and all other complex status functions.
Abstract licence: CC BY-NC-ND
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