More is less? The curvilinear effects of political ties on corporate innovation performance
Mingchuan Yu, Yujie Lu, Chao Li and 2 more
Technological and Economic Development of Economy · 2019
doi:10.3846/tede.2019.10718 (opens in a new tab)
We email you when a new notice or a question about this paper appears.
Abstract
Previous research has explored the impact of political ties on corporate innovation performance, yet with controversial results. This study proposes that political ties has a curvilinear impact on innovation performance, and the resulting curvilinear relationship is moderated by absorptive capacity and external environment. We conduct examination based on a survey among Chinese manufacturing firms, which demonstrates an inverted U-shape relationship between political ties and corporate innovation performance. This inverted U-shape relationship is moderated by the absorptive capacity, which means the positive effect of political ties on corporate innovation performance is strong when the absorptive capacity of a firm is high. Furthermore, political ties, absorptive capacity and external environment (i.e. dynamism, munificence, and complexity) have a three-way interactive effect on corporate innovation, which means firms with strong political ties exhibit the highest innovation performance when their absorptive capacity and external environmental condition (dynamism or munificence or complexity) stand at high level simultaneously. The research findings provide a comprehensive understanding for firms, especially for those with different characteristics and under different external environments, to exploit political ties to facilitate corporate innovation performance.
Abstract licence: CC BY
Reads
Read by people on this page
None yet.
Checked or read by AI through naulon
None yet.
A person counts once a day per paper. We keep no cookie and no address: a reader is a hash that changes every day. Any month under five reads shows no number.
Are you an author?
Is this your paper?
Claim it to add your note and be paid when agents cite it. Free.