Marx’s Epistemology and the Problem of Conflated Idealisms
Vicent L. Casil
International Journal of Philosophy and Social Values · 2018
doi:10.34632/philosophyandsocialvalues.2018.2710 (opens in a new tab)
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Abstract
Focusing on the conceptual terms of the idealist-realist debate, the paper shows that the inability of the realists to recognize Marx’s idealist heritage is out of the realists’ limited understanding of the category of idealism in their reading. To prove the paper’s case, the first section starts with elucidation of Marx’s concept of epistemological idealism as read by his interpreters. It shows the actual meaning of epistemological idealism as used by Kolakowski, Lukacs, and other idealist readers of Marx. The second section shows how the realists conflate the two idealisms, how the realist reading is erroneously grounded on failure to clarify the difference between the concept of ontological and epistemological idealism. The third section highlights the differences between epistemological and ontological idealism. It explains that Ontological idealism claims that idea is the fundamental reality, while epistemological idealism suggests that knowledge is dependent upon the subject.
Abstract licence: CC BY
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