Secrecy Capacity of a Class of Erasure Wiretap Channels in WBAN

In wireless body area networks (WBANs), the secrecy of personal health information is vulnerable to attacks due to the openness of wireless communication. In this paper, we study the security problem of WBANs, where there exists an attacker or eavesdropper who is able to observe data from part of sensors. The legitimate communication within the WBAN is modeled as a discrete memoryless channel (DMC) by establishing the secrecy capacity of a class of finite state Markov erasure wiretap channels. Meanwhile, the tapping of the eavesdropper is modeled as a finite-state Markov erasure channel (FSMEC). A pair of encoder and decoder are devised to make the eavesdropper have no knowledge of the source message, and enable the receiver to recover the source message with a small decoding error. It is proved that the secrecy capacity can be achieved by migrating the coding scheme for wiretap channel II with the noisy main channel. This method provides a new idea solving the secure problem of the internet of things (IoT).

Abstract licence: CC BY

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