A Strategic Bargaining Game for a Spectrum Sharing Scheme in Cognitive Radio-Based Heterogeneous Wireless Sensor Networks

In Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), unlicensed users, that is, sensor nodes, have excessively exploited the unlicensed radio spectrum. Through Cognitive Radio (CR), licensed radio spectra, which are owned by licensed users, can be partly or entirely shared with unlicensed users. This paper proposes a strategic bargaining spectrum-sharing scheme, considering a CR-based heterogeneous WSN (HWSN). The sensors of HWSNs are discrepant and exist in different wireless environments, which leads to various signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) for the same or different licensed users. Unlicensed users bargain with licensed users regarding the spectrum price. In each round of bargaining, licensed users are allowed to adaptively adjust their spectrum price to the best for maximizing their profits.. Then, each unlicensed user makes their best response and informs licensed users of “bargaining” and “warning”. Through finite rounds of bargaining, this scheme can obtain a Nash bargaining solution (NBS), which makes all licensed and unlicensed users reach an agreement. The simulation results demonstrate that the proposed scheme can quickly find a NBS and all players in the game prefer to be honest. The proposed scheme outperforms existing schemes, within a certain range, in terms of fairness and trade success probability.

Abstract licence: CC BY

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