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A Review of Key Likert Scale Development Advances: 1995–2019
Andrew T. Jebb, Vincent Ng, Louis Tay
Frontiers in Psychology · 2021 · Review · CC BY
Abstract
Developing self-report Likert scales is an essential part of modern psychology. However, it is hard for psychologists to remain apprised of best practices as methodological developments accumulate. To address this, this current paper offers a selective review of advances in Likert scale development that have occurred over the past 25 years. We reviewed six major measurement journals (e.g., Psychological Methods , Educational , and Psychological Measurement ) between the years 1995–2019 and identified key advances, ultimately including 40 papers and offering written summaries of each. We supplemented this review with an in-depth discussion of five particular advances: (1) conceptions of construct validity, (2) creating better construct definitions, (3) readability tests for generating items, (4) alternative measures of precision [e.g., coefficient omega and item response theory (IRT) information], and (5) ant colony optimization (ACO) for creating short forms. The Supplementary Material provides further technical details on these advances and offers guidance on software implementation. This paper is intended to be a resource for psychological researchers to be informed about more recent psychometric progress in Likert scale creation.
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From PubMed Central, U.S. National Library of Medicine, as current on Oct 19, 2026. Paragraph numbers are ours, so an answer can point at one.
Introduction
Psychological data are diverse and range from observations of behavior to face-to-face interviews. However, in modern times, one of the most common measurement methods is the self-report Likert scale. Likert scales provide a convenient way to measure unobservable constructs, and published tutorials detailing the process of their development have been highly influential, such as and (being cited over 6,500 and 3,000 times, respectively, according to Google scholar).
Notably, however, it has been roughly 25 years since these seminal papers were published, and specific best-practices have changed or evolved since then. Recently, gave an update to their 1995 article, integrating some newer topics into a general tutorial of Likert scale creation. However, scale creation—from defining the construct to testing nomological relationships—is such an extensive process that it is challenging for any paper to give full coverage to each of its stages. The authors were quick to note this themselves several times, e.g., “[w]e have space only to raise briefly some key issues” and “unfortunately we do not have the space to do justice to these developments here” (p. 5). Therefore, a contribution to psychology would be a paper that provides a review of advances in Likert scale development since classic tutorials were published. This paper would not be a general tutorial in scale development like,,, or others. Instead, it would focus on more recent advances and serve as a complement to these broader tutorials.
The present paper seeks to serve as such a resource by reviewing developments in Likert scale creation from the past 25 years. However, given that scale development is such an extensive topic, the limitations of this review should be made very explicit. The first limitations are with regard to scope. This is not a review of psychometrics, which would be impossibly broad, or advances in self-report in general, which would also be unwieldy (e.g., including measurement techniques like implicit measures and forced choice scales). This is a review of the initial development and validation of self-report Likert scales. Therefore, we also excluded measurement topics related the use self-report scales, like identifying and controlling for response biases.1 Although this scope obviously omits many important aspects of measurement, it was necessary to do the review.
Importantly, like, ),, this paper was written at the level of the general psychologist, not methodologists, in order to benefit the field of psychology most broadly. This also meant that our scope was to fine articles that were broad enough to apply to most cases of Likert scale development. As a result, we omitted articles, for example, that only discussed measuring certain types of constructs [e.g., paper on the incremental validation of new clinical measures].
The second major limitation concerns its objectivity. Performing any review of what is “significant” requires, at a point, making subjective judgment calls. The majority of the papers we reviewed were fairly easy to decide on. For example, we included because they tackled a major Likert scale issue: the ideal number of response options (as well as the comparative performance of visual analog scales). By contrast, we excluded because their advance was about monitoring the attention of subjects taking surveys online, not about scale development, per se. However, other papers were more difficult to decide on. Our method of handling this ambuity is described below, but we do not try claim that subjectivity did not play a part of the review process in some way.
Additionally, (a) we did not survey every single journal where advances may have been published2 and (b) articles published after 2019 were not included. Despite all these limitations, this review was still worth performing. Self-report Likert scales are an incredibly dominant source of data in psychology and the social sciences in general. The divide between methodological and substantive literatures—and between methodologists and substantive researchers—can increase over time, but they can also be reduced by good communication and dissemination. The current review is our attempt to bridge, in part, that gap.
To conduct this review, we examined every issue of six major journals related to psychological measurement from January 1995 to December 2019 (inclusive), screening out articles by either title and/or abstract. The full text of any potentially relevant article was reviewed by either the first or second author, and any borderline cases were discussed until a consensus was reached. A PRISMA flowchart of the process is shown in Figure 1. The journals we surveyed were: Applied Psychological Measurement, Psychological Assessment, Educational and Psychological Measurement, Psychological Methods, Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science, and Organizational Research Methods. For inclusion, our criteria were that the advance had to be: (a) related to the creation of self-report Likert scales (seven excluded), (b) broad and significant enough for a general psychological audience (23 excluded), and (c) not superseded or encapsulated by newer developments (11 excluded). The advances we included are shown in Table 1, along with a short descriptive summary of each. Scale developers should not feel compelled to use all of these techniques, just those that contribute to better measurement in their context. More specific contexts (e.g., measuring socially sensitive constructs) can utilize additional resources.
To supplement this literature review, the remainder of the paper provides a more in-depth discussion of five of these advances that span a range of topics. These were chosen due to their importance, uniqueness, or ease-of-use, and lack of general coverage in classic scale creation papers. These are: (1) conceptualizations of construct validity, (2) approaches for creating more precise construct definitions, (3) readability tests for generating items, (4) alternative measures of precision (e.g., coefficient omega), and (5) ant colony optimization (ACO) for creating short forms. These developments are presented in roughly the order of what stage they occur in the process of scale creation, a schematic diagram of which is shown in Figure 2.
Two Views of Validity
Psychologists recognize validity as the fundamental concept of psychometrics and one of the most critical aspects of psychological science. However, what is “validity?” Despite the widespread agreement about its importance, there is disagreement about how validity should be defined. In particular, there are two divergent perspectives on the definition. The first major perspective defines validity not as a property of tests but as a property of the interpretations of test scores. This view can be therefore called the interpretation camp or validity as construct validity, which is the perspective endorsed by, and standards set forth by governing agencies for the North American educational and psychological measurement supracommunity. Construct validity is based on a synthesis and analysis of the evidence that supports a certain interpretation of test scores, so validity is a property of interpretive inferences about test scores (, p. 13), especially interpreting score meaning (, p. 17). Because the context of measurement affects test scores (, pp. 14–15), the results of any validation effort are conditional upon the context in and group characteristics of the sample with which the studies were done, as are claims of validity drawn from these empirical results.
The other major perspective revivifies one of the oldest and most intuitive definitions of validity: “…whether or not a test measures what it purports to measure” (, p. 14). In other words, on this view, validity is a property of tests rather than interpretations. Validity is simply whether or not the statement, “test X measures attribute Y,” is true. To be true, it requires (a) that Y exists and (b) that variations in Y cause variations in X. This definition can be called the test validity view and finds ample precedent in psychometric texts. However,, citing the Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing, reject this conception of validity.
Ultimately, this disagreement does not show any signs of resolving, and interested readers can consult papers that have attempted to integrate or adjudicate on the two views.
There Aren’t “Types” of Validity; Validity Is “One”
Even though there are stark differences between these two definitions of validity, one thing they do agree on is that there are not different “types” of validity. Language like “content validity” and “criterion-related validity” is misleading because it implies that their typical analytic procedures produce empirical evidence that does not bear on the central inference of interpreting the score’s meaning (i.e., construct validity;, pp. 13–14, 17, 19–21). Rather, there is only (construct) validity, and different validation procedures and types of evidence all contribute to making inferences about score meaning.
Despite the agreement that validity is a unitary concept, psychologists seem to disagree in practice; as of 2013, there were 122 distinct subtypes of validity, many of them named after the fourth edition of the Standards that stated that validity-type language was inappropriate. A consequence of speaking this way is that it perpetuates the view (a) that there are independent “types” of validity (b) that entail different analytic procedures to (c) produce corresponding types of evidence that (d) themselves correspond to different categories of inference. This is why to even speak of content, construct, and criterion-related “analyses” (e.g.,;; ) can be problematic, since this misleads researchers into thinking that these produce distinct kinds of empirical evidence that have a direct, one-to-one correspondence to the three broad categories of inferences with which they are typically associated.
However, an analytic procedure traditionally associated with a certain “type” of validity can be used to produce empirical evidence for another “type” of validity not typically associated with it. For instance, showing that the focal construct is empirically discriminable from similar constructs would constitute strong evidence for the inference of discriminability. However, the researcher could use analyses typically associated with “criterion and incremental validity” to investigate discriminability as well (e.g., ). Thus, the key takeaway is to think not of “discriminant validity” or distinct “types” of validity, but to use a wide variety of research designs and statistical analyses to potentially provide evidence that may or may not support a given inference under investigation (e.g., discriminability). This demonstrates that thinking about validity “types” can be unnecessarily restrictive because it misleads researchers into thinking about validity as a fragmented concept, leading to negative downstream consequences in validation practice.
Ensuring Concept Clarity
Defining the construct one is interested in measuring is a foundational part of scale development; failing to do so properly undermines every scientific activity that follows (T. L.;;; ). However, there are lingering issues with conceptual clarity in the social sciences. noted that “As someone who has been reviewing journal articles for more than 30 years, I estimate that about 90% of the submissions I get suffer from problems of conceptual clarity” (p. 146), and stated that, “it is…obvious that the problem of inadequate conceptual definitions remains an issue for scholars in the organizational, behavioral, and social sciences” (p. 160). To support this effort, we surveyed key papers on construct clarity and integrated their recommendations into Table 2, adding our own comments where appropriate. We cluster this advice into three “aspects” of formulating a construct definition, each of which contains several specific strategies.
Specifying the Latent Continuum
In addition to clearly articulating the concept, there are other parts to defining a psychological construct for empirical measurement. Another recent development demonstrates the importance of incorporating the latent continuum in measurement. Briefly, many psychological concepts like emotion and self-esteem are conceived as having degrees of magnitudes (e.g., “low,” “moderate,” and “high”), and these degrees can be represented by a construct continuum. The continuum was originally a primary focus in early psychological measurement, but the advent of the convenient Likert(-type) scaling pushed it into the background.
However, defining the characteristics of this continuum is needed for proper measurement. For instance, what do the poles (i.e., endpoints) of the construct represent? Is the lower pole its absence, or is it the presence of an opposing construct (i.e., a unipolar or bipolar continuum)? And, what do the different continuum degrees actually represent? If the construct is a positive emotion, do they represent the intensity of experience or the frequency of experience? Quite often, scale developers do not define these aspects but leave them implicit. discuss different problems that can arise from this.
In addition to defining the continuum, there is also the practical issue of fully operationalizing the continuum. This involves ensuring that the whole continuum is well-represented when creating items. It also means being mindful when including reverse-worded items in their scales. These items may measure an opposite construct, which is desirable if the construct is bipolar (e.g., positive emotions as including happy and sad), but contaminates measurement if the construct is unipolar (e.g., positive emotions as only including feeling happy). Finally, developers should choose a response format that aligns with whether the continuum has been specified as unipolar or bipolar. For example, the numerical rating of 0–4 typically implies a unipolar scale to the respondent, whereas a −3-to-3 response scale implies a bipolar scale. Verbal labels like “Not at all” to “Extremely” imply unipolarity, whereas formats like “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree” imply bipolarity. also discuss operationalizing the continuum with regard to two other issues, assessing dimensionality of the scale and assuming the correct response process.
Readability Tests for Items
The current psychometric practice is to keep item statements short and simple with language that is familiar to the target respondents. Instructions like these alleviate readability problems because psychologists are usually good at identifying and revising difficult items. However, professional psychologists also have a much higher degree of education compared to the rest of the population. In the United States, less than 2% of adults have doctorates, and a majority do not have a degree past high school. The average United States adult has an estimated 8th-grade reading level, with 20% of adults falling below a 5th-grade level. Researchers can probably catch and remove scale items that are extremely verbose (e.g., “I am garrulous”), but items that might not be easily understood by target respondents may slip through the item creation process. Social science samples frequently consist of university students, but this subpopulation has a higher reading level than the general population, and issues that would manifest for other respondents might not be evident when using such samples.
In addition to asking respondents directly (see for an example), another tool to assess readability is to use readability tests, which have already been used by scale developers in psychology (e.g.,; ). Readability tests are formulas that score the readability of some piece of writing, often as a function of the number of words per sentence and number of syllables per word. These tests only take seconds to implement and can serve as an additional way to check item language beyond the intuitions of scale developers. When these tests are used, scale items should only be analyzed individually, as testing the readability of the whole scale together can hide one or more difficult items. If an item receives a low readability score, the developer can revise the item.
There are many different readability tests available, such as the Flesch Reading Ease test, the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level Studies test, the Gunning fog index, SMOG index, Automated Readability Index, and Coleman-Liau Index. These operate in much the same way, outputting an estimated grade level based on sentence and word length.
We reviewed their formulas and reviews on the topic (e.g., ). At the outset, we state that no statistic is univocally superior to all the others. It is possible to implement several tests and compare the results. However, we recommend the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level Studies test because it (a) is among the most commonly used, (b) is expressed in grade school levels, and (c) is easily implemented in Microsoft Word. The score indicates what United States grade level the readability is suited. Given average reading grade levels in the United States, researchers can aim for a readability score of 8.0 or below for their items. There are several examples of scale developers using this reading test. found that 80% of the Depression Adjective Check Lists was at an eighth-grade reading level. used the test to check whether a measure of subjective well-being was suitable for children. As our own exercise, we took three recent instances of scale development in the Journal of Applied Psychology and ran readability tests on their items. This analysis is presented in the Supplementary Material.
Alpha and Omega
A major focus of scale development is demonstrating its reliability, defined formally as the proportion of true score variance to total score variance. The most common estimator of reliability in psychology is coefficient alpha. However, alpha is sometimes a less-than-ideal measure because it assumes that all scale items have the same true score variance. Put in terms of latent variable modeling, this means that alpha estimates true reliability only if the factor loadings across items are the same,3 something that is “rare for psychological scales” (, p. 409). Violating this assumption makes alpha underestimate true reliability. Often, this underestimation may be small, but it will increase for scales with fewer items and with greater differences in population factor loadings.
A proposed solution to this is to relax this assumption and adopt the less stringent congeneric model of measurement. The most prominent estimator in this group is coefficient omega,4 which uses a factor model to obtain reliability estimates. Importantly, omega performs at least as well as alpha if alpha’s assumptions hold. However, one caveat is that the estimator requires a good-fitting factor model for estimation. Omega and its confidence interval can be computed with the psych package in R (for unidimensional scales, the “omega.tot” statistic from the function “omega;” ). provides a software tutorial in R and Excel [see also and ].
Reliability vs. IRT Information
Alpha, omega, and other reliability estimators stem from the classical test theory paradigm of measurement, where the focus is on the overall reliability of the psychological scale. The other measurement paradigm, item response theory (IRT), focuses on the “reliability” of the scale at a given level of the latent trait or at the level of the item. In IRT, this is operationalized as informationIRT5.
Although they are analogous concepts, informationIRT and reliability are different.
Whereas traditional reliability is only assessed at the scale-level, informationIRT can be assessed at three levels: the response category, item, and test. InformationIRT is a full mathematical function which shows how the precision changes across latent trait levels. These features translate into several advantages for the scale developer.
First, items can be evaluated for how much precision they have. Items that are not informative can be eliminated in favor of items that are (for a tutorial, see ). Second, the test information function shows how precisely the full scale measures each region of the latent trait. If a certain region is deficient, items can be added to better capture that region (or removed, if the region has been measured enough). Finally, suppose the scale developer is only interested in measuring a certain region of the latent trait range, such as middle-performers or high and low performers. In that case, informationIRT can help them do so. Further details are provided in the Supplementary Material.
Maximizing Validity in Short Forms Using Ant Colony Optimization
Increasingly, psychologists wish to use short scales in their work,6 as they reduce respondent time, fatigue, and required financial compensation. To date, the most common approaches aim to maintain reliability and include retaining items with the highest factor loadings and item-total correlations. However, these strategies can incidentally impair measurement, as items with higher intercorrelations will usually have more similar content, resulting in less scale content (i.e., the attenuation paradox; ).
A more recent method for constructing short forms is a computational algorithm called ACO. Instead of just maximizing reliability, this method can incorporate any number of evaluative criteria, such as associations with variables, factor model fit, and others. When reducing a Big 5 personality scale, found that, for a mixture of criteria (e.g., CFA fit indices, latent correlations), ACO either equaled or surpassed the alternative methods for creating short forms, such as maximizing factor loadings, minimizing modification indices, a genetic algorithm, and the PURIFY algorithm (see also ). Since ACO has been introduced to psychology, it has been used in the creation of real psychological scales for proactive personality and supervisor support, psychological situational characteristics, and others.
The logic of ACO comes from how ants resolve the problem of determining the shortest path to their hive when they find food. The ants solve it by (a) randomly sampling different paths toward the food and (b) laying down chemical pheromones that attract other ants. The paths that provide quicker solutions acquire pheromones more rapidly, attracting more ants, and thus more pheromone. Ultimately, a positive feedback loop is created until the ants converge on the best path (the solution).
The ACO algorithm works similarly. When creating a short form of N items, ACO first randomly samples N items from the full scale (the N “paths”). Next, the performance of that short form is evaluated by one or more statistical measures, such as the association with another variable, reliability, and/or factor model fit. Based on these measures, if the sampled items performed well, their probability weight is increased (the amount of “pheromone”). Over repeated iterations, the items that led to good performance will become increasingly weighted for selection, creating a positive feedback loop that eventually converges to a final solution. Thus, ACO, like the ants, does not search and test all possible solutions. Instead, it uses some criterion for evaluating the items and then uses this to update the probability of selecting those items.
ACO is an automated procedure, but this does not mean that researchers should accept its results automatically. Foremost, ACO does not guarantee that the shortened scale has satisfactory content. Therefore, the items that comprise the final scale should always be examined to see if their content is sufficient.
We also strongly recommend that authors using ACO be explicit about the specifications of the algorithm. Authors should always report (a) what criteria they are using to evaluate short form performance and (b) how these are mathematically translated into pheromone weights. Authors should also report all the other relevant details of conducting the algorithm (e.g., the software package, the number of total iterations). In the Supplementary Material, we provide further details and a full R software walkthrough. For more information, the reader can consult additional resources.
Discussion
Measurement in psychology comes in many forms, and for many constructs, one of the best methods is the psychological Likert scale. A recent review suggests that, in the span of just a few years, dozens of scales are added to the psychological science literature. Thus, psychologists must have a clear understanding of the proper theory and procedures for scale creation. This present article aims to increase this clarity by offering a selective review of Likert scale development advances over the past 25 years. Classic papers delineating the process of Likert scale development have proven immensely useful to the field, but it is difficult to do justice to this whole topic in a single paper, especially as methodological developments accumulate.
Though this paper reviewed past work, we end with some notes about the future. As methods progress, they become more sophisticated, but sophistication should not be mistaken for accuracy. This applies even to some of the techniques discussed here, such as ACO, which has crucial limitations (e.g., it depends on what predicted external variable is chosen and requires a subjective examination of sufficient content).
Second, we are concerned with the problem of construct proliferation, as are other social scientists (e.g.,; ). Solutions to this problem include paying close attention to the constructs that have already been established in the literature, as well as engaging in a critical and honest reflection on whether one’s target construct is meaningfully different. In cases of scale development, the developer should provide sufficient arguments for these two criteria: the construct’s (a) importance and (b) distinctiveness. Although scholars are quite adept at theoretically distinguishing a “new” construct from a prior one, empirical methods should only be enlisted after this has been established.
Finally, as psychological theory progresses, it tends to become more complex. One issue with this increasing complexity is the danger of creating incoherent constructs., p. 33) provides an example of a scale with three items: (1) “I would like to be a military leader,” (2) “.10 sqrt (0.05+0.05) = …,” and (3) “I am over six feet tall” (p. 33). Although no common construct exists among these items, the scale can certainly be scored and will probably even be reliable, as the random error variance will be low. Therefore, measures of such incoherent constructs can display good psychometric properties, and psychologists cannot merely rely on empirical evidence for justifying them. Thus, the challenges of scale development of the present and future are equally empirical and theoretical.
Author Contributions
LT conceived the idea for the manuscript and provided feedback and editing. AJ conducted most of the literature review and wrote much of the manuscript. VN assisted with the literature review and contributed writing. All authors contributed to the article and approved the submitted version.
Conflict of Interest
The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
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