Quantification in Experimental Psychology and Pragmatic Epistemology: Tension Between the Scientific Imperative and the Social Imperative
Hervé Guyon
Frontiers in Psychology · 2021
doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.603617 (opens in a new tab)
We email you when a new notice or a question about this paper appears.
Abstract
Our position is critical of the dominant method in psychology, and critical of the social use of psychological models. We assert that the scientific approach in psychology must break with modernist claim, but without sinking into post-modernist relativism. We consider that the epistemology associated with experimental psychology should be a specific epistemology associated with the particular objects studied. By calling on pragmatism and realism, psychology can find the resources to use quantitative studies as an action deployed within a complex, interactive and dynamic social space, and thus break with its normative practice and function.
Abstract licence: CC BY
References50
40 more references, whose wording the paper’s licence keeps private.
All 50 referencesReads
Read by people on this page
None yet.
Checked or read by AI through naulon
None yet.
A person counts once a day per paper. We keep no cookie and no address: a reader is a hash that changes every day. Any month under five reads shows no number.
Are you an author?
Is this your paper?
Claim it to add your note and be paid when agents cite it. Free.