Arguments against memory trace decay: A SIMPLE account of Baddeley & Scott

Does decay cause forgetting? For memory over the long-term, the answer is generally agreed to be “no ” (e.g., McGeoch, 1932). For memory over shorter time-periods, however, debate continues (e.g., Altmann and Gray, 2008; Lewandowsky et al., 2009). The issue has important theoretical implications, as the claim that forgetting differs over timescales is central to arguments against models of memory that deny the utility of distinguishing between shortterm and long-term memory (e.g., Brown et al., 2007). Here we address two remaining issues. The first concerns empirical data. Although many results taken as evidence for decay have been accounted for by alternative accounts (e.g., in terms of interference: Neath and Brown, 2006; Brown et al., 2007), it has been argued that forgetting demonstrated by Baddeley and Scott (1971) cannot be explained without recourse to trace decay. Indeed, Nairne (2003, p. 429) stated that “the conclusions reached by Baddeley and Scott (1971) have largely dominated the field for the past three decades. ” Here, we argue that an interference-based explanation originally dismissed by Baddeley and Scott can in fact account for their data. The second issue is conceptual, and concerns the possible equivalence of decay and nondecay memory models. The findings of Baddeley and Scott (1971) In a typical Brown–Peterson task (Brown,

Abstract licence: CC BY

22 more references, whose wording the paper’s licence keeps private.

A person counts once a day per paper. We keep no cookie and no address: a reader is a hash that changes every day. Any month under five reads shows no number.