Tropical medicine: The economics and the evolving practice of antitrust remedies in Brazil
Eduardo Pontual Ribeiro
Russian Journal of Economics · 2020
doi:10.32609/j.ruje.6.51143 (opens in a new tab)
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Abstract
Antitrust remedies are a central part of the competition policy toolbox. Their actual use and design depends on interrelated factors such as the Antitrust Authority’s analytical capabilities, institutional design and bargaining power. Economics can contribute to the design of remedies, using a transaction cost, principal-agent incomplete contract framework, as remedies are generally drawn as an agreement between the Authority and parties under extensive information asymmetries. This provides a rationale for the principles and policies’ choices of the Brazilian Antitrust Authority, CADE, on remedies over the past decade. There has been a shift towards agreements instead of unilaterally imposed remedies, extensive use of trustees and communication by an Antitrust Remedies Guide to signal CADE’s policies.
Abstract licence: CC BY-NC-ND
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