Bit, videz in gola navideznost. Od Parmenida k Platonu

Being, Seeming, and Mere Seemingness. From Parmenides Towards Plato The present paper is an attempt to rethink the relationship between being and seeming at the outset of metaphysics as demonstrated in Heidegger’s history of being. Following Heidegger’s interpretation of Parmenides’s poem On Nature, the paper demonstrates the original ancient Greek relationship between being and seeming, when both were understood in terms of the proto-metaphysical phýsis. It illustrates crucial moments in the search for being from Parmenides to Plato, which lead to the abandonment of seeming. It is shown how the movement from cave-like seeming to knowing transformed the notion of seeming and drew it away from being into mere seemingness.

Abstract licence: CC BY

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