The Economic Impact of a Bioterrorist Attack: Are Prevention and Postattack Intervention Programs Justifiable?

Abstract

Understanding and quantifying the impact of a bioterrorist attack are essential in developing public health preparedness for such an attack. We constructed a model that compares the impact of three classic agents of biologic warfare (Bacillus anthracis, Brucella melitensis, and Francisella tularensis) when released as aerosols in the suburb of a major city. The model shows that the economic impact of a bioterrorist attack can range from an estimated $477.7 million per 100,000 persons exposed (brucellosis scenario) to $26.2 billion per 100,000 persons exposed (anthrax scenario). Rapid implementation of a postattack prophylaxis program is the single most important means of reducing these losses. By using an insurance analogy, our model provides economic justification for preparedness measures.

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• Modeling Potential Responses to Smallpox as a Bioterrorist Weapon · 2001
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• The Economic Impact of Pandemic Influenza in the United States: Priorities for Intervention · 1999
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