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Developing and Evaluating the Optimal Model of Accrual Accounting System in the Public Sector (Case study: Managers and Accountants of Executive Bodies)

Abdul Rahman Naroui, Alireza Momeni, Aziz GORD

حسابداری دولتی · 2020

doi:10.30473/gaa.2020.54322.1403 (opens in a new tab)

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Abstract

Subject and Purpose of the Article: The present research seeks to develop and evaluate the optimal model of accrual accounting system in the public sector (Case study: managers and accountants of executive bodies). The purpose of this research is to present an optimal model of accrual accounting system in the public sector. Research Method: The present research has been of sequential exploratory project type. Therefore, theme analysis and the network of themes type in the qualitative phase and survey study in the quantitative phase have been used. Research Findings: The findings of the qualitative phase showed that the network optimal theoretical model of accrual accounting system in the public sector has been saturated theoretically from 4 comprehensive themes (Including: A- Increasing institutional trust in the executive apparatus, B- Improving the management process, C- Increasing organizational productivity and D- Improving financial laws and regulations), 9 organized themes and 43 basic themes and a conceptual model has been construct. Conclusion, Originality and its Contribution to the Knowledge: In order to present the optimal model of accrual accounting system in the public sector, a conceptual model has been developed and evaluated.

Abstract licence: CC BY-NC-ND

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