Axiology and the Problem of Evil
Crozat Elliott R.
Perichoresis: The Theological Journal of Emanuel University · 2023
doi:10.2478/perc-2023-0006 (opens in a new tab)
We email you when a new notice or a question about this paper appears.
Abstract
In this article, I contend that (a) disagreement over the definition of ‘good person’ indicates a challenge for the probabilistic argument from evil (PAE) and (b) the debate between value monism and value pluralism exposes obstacles for the PAE. I also highlight areas for further axiological inquiry with respect to the problem of evil and related problems. My goal is not to argue that the PAE fails, but to examine the axiology of the argument, to investigate some of its vulnerabilities, and to motivate novel evaluations of it by reframing it as an axiological rather than moral issue.
Abstract licence: CC BY-NC-ND
Reads
Read by people on this page
None yet.
Checked or read by AI through naulon
None yet.
A person counts once a day per paper. We keep no cookie and no address: a reader is a hash that changes every day. Any month under five reads shows no number.
Are you an author?
Is this your paper?
Claim it to add your note and be paid when agents cite it. Free.