Nietzsche’s critique of moral values
Savić Mićo
Filozofija i Društvo · 2012
doi:10.2298/fid1203348s (opens in a new tab)
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Abstract
In this article the author argues that Nietzsche?s critique of morality is based on his metaphysics in which the notion of will to power conceived in the spirit of the Greek concept of physis plays a key role. He demonstrates that the revaluation of all values as overcoming of Platonist-Christian nihilism is aimed at the affirmation of ?living in accordance with nature?, whereby nature is understood just as physis. He also shows why, for Nietzsche, pretension to universality and objectivity of the dominant value system is not justified. Finally, the author points to the difficulties of Nietzsche?s (inverse) Platonism and concludes that the failure of modernity to justify morality imposes the task of examining the possibilities of rehabilitation of Aristotle?s practical philosophy.
Abstract licence: CC BY-NC-ND
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