Testing Whether Field Auction Experiments Are Demand Revealing in Practice
Jay R. Corrigan, Matthew C. Rousu
Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics · 2008
doi:10.22004/ag.econ.42464 (opens in a new tab)
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Abstract
Recent evidence suggests that participants' misunderstanding of experimental auction mechanism can systematically bias auction results. We present a simple technique for testing whether field auction mechanism and, by extension, whether auction bids provide an unbiased estimate of participants' willingness to pay.
Abstract licence: CC BY-NC
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