Utylitaryzm reguł, znaczenie intencji i ocena terroryzmu (Rule utilitarianism, relevance of intention and moral permissibility of terrorism)

Rule utilitarianism, relevance of intention and moral permissibility of terrorism In this paper I consider the puzzling question of moral responsibility of some quite specific terrorist acts. One distinguishable, but highly controversial, example of such a case may be the allied terror-bombing of German cities by English and American forces during the end of World War II, with so many civilian victims. I propose strict definition of terrorism, and after that, go on with the question: Is it really so obvious and certain that all acts of terrorism are impermissible on moral grounds? Then I investigate the relevance of intention for moral evaluation of any case of terrorism. In these matters I get involved in dispute with Jeff McMahan’s thesis that all acts of terrorism are inherently morally wrong and impermissible, and criticize his employment of the Principle of Double Effect.

Abstract licence: CC BY-SA

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