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The Reality of Consciousness and Its Logical Intermittences: from Hegel to Bergson

Riccardo Roni

Open Journal of Humanities · 2020

doi:10.17605/osf.io/kjst6 (opens in a new tab)

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Abstract

The critic of substance immobility through negation constitutes the starting point of the ‘voyage of discovery’ of Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes, in which mind and body experiences are considered in terms of mutual recognition, without denying the subjectivity. In this article I am discussing some aspects of Hegel’s philosophy of spirit after Nietzsche’s ‘experimentalism’ and Dennett’s theory of mind, in order to articulate, through Bergson, two fundamental reasons. The first concerns the subject and the dramatic awareness of its constitutional temporality and, at the same time, the possibility to transcend the limit of ‘here’ and ‘now’. On this basis, the second regards the indefensibility of nihilism, because, thanks to consciousness and its continuous activity, the temporal subject, from Hegel to Bergson, persists as a ‘dark side’, in which a constant ‘overcoming’ (élan) of an implicitly normative and essentially social practice takes place.

Abstract licence: CC BY

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