TO BE OR NOT TO BE “SUBTLY” PHILOSOPHICALLY COLONIZED*

ABSTRACT An often-adopted use of the predicate, “to be colonized”, is one that applies it loosely, not in reference to original Africans or indigenous people enslaved by Europeans or heirs of enslaved persons, but to academics who are citizens of former colonies like Brazil, their ways of thinking, philosophical works, academic communities, etc. But under what conditions one is to do that? And how can one avoid the attribution of such predicate to oneself or one’s works? These issues have not received much attention. While dialoguing with authors associated with decolonial studies, Brazilian, continental and analytic philosophers, this essay aims to contribute to change this situation. It does so by proposing an alternative use of the predicate, “to be ‘subtly’ philosophically colonized”, according to which this predicate is to be applied to philosophical works that have the thirteen features described in the essay or at least most of them. It is argued that this alternative use is to be endorsed because it is: precise; exemplified in a detailed way by at least one philosophical work; and “inexplosive” in not suggesting the “explosive” claim that practically all Western philosophical works are colonized by Western metaphysics.

Abstract licence: CC BY

A person counts once a day per paper. We keep no cookie and no address: a reader is a hash that changes every day. Any month under five reads shows no number.