Non cooperative Stackelberg network formation
Juan M.C Larrosa
Cuadernos de Economía · 2014
doi:10.15446/cuad.econ.v33n63.45336 (opens in a new tab)
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Abstract
Non-cooperative network formation games in industrial organizations analyze how firms create links. We assume that links portray cost-reducing information and that access to this information is not reciprocal. We study the consequences in terms of profits if one firm can move first in establishing a link. A classic model of exogenous Stackelberg leadership is developed and first-mover advantage is observed.
Abstract licence: CC BY-NC-ND
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