ASIMETRI INFORMASI DAN UNDERPRICING
Tety Anggita Safitri
Jurnal Dinamika Manajemen · 2013
doi:10.15294/jdm.v4i1.2419 (opens in a new tab)
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Abstract
Tujuan penelitian ini adalah untuk menguji pengaruh asimetri informasi terhadap underpricing. Penelitian ini menggunakan sampel 63 perusahaan yang melakukan penawaran umum perdana di Bursa Efek Indonesia dalam kurun waktu 2005-2010. Analisis data menggunakan regresi linier berganda, yaitu menguji proksi asimetri informasi yang terdiri atas ukuran perusahaan, umur perusahaan, proporsi saham yang ditawarkan kepada masyarakat, reputasi underwriter dan reputasi auditor terhadap underpricing. Hasil penelitian ini mengindikasikan bahwa reputasi underwriter dan reputasi auditor berpengaruh terhadap underpricing. Ukuran perusahaan, umur perusahaan dan proporsi saham yang ditawarkan tidak berpengaruh terhadap underpricing.<br /><br /><br />The aim of this research is to examine the effect of assymetric information on underpricing. This research used a sample of 63 companies that make initial public offering on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in the period of 2005-2010. The data analysis is using multiple linear regression, which is testing the proxy of asymmetric information which consists of the firm size, the firm age, the proportion of shares offered to the public, underwriter reputation and auditor reputation on underpricing. This research indicates that underwriter reputation and auditor reputation have a significant effect on underpricing. The firm size, the firm age and the proportion of shares offered to the public have no significant effect on underpricing.<br /><br />
Abstract licence: CC BY
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