Cavell’s Method
Sandra Laugier
Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy · 2021
doi:10.15173/jhap.v9i9.4916 (opens in a new tab)
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Abstract
It may be time to question analytic philosophy’s structural ignorance of the methods of ordinary language philosophy. Cavell’s Must We Mean What We Say? upsets the analytic tradition to this end, pursuing a “linguistic phenomenology” that focuses on ordinary language use as a resource for describing the world. Cavell thereby entrusts the tradition with a more ambitious and concrete philosophical task.
Abstract licence: CC BY-NC
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