Representing the People vs Channelling Them: Constitutional Niceties in an Age of Instant Democratic Gratification

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2016 1(3), 1263-1267 | European Forum Highlight of 14 November 2016 | (Abstract) On 3 November 2016 the High Court decided in the case R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union that the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom cannot serve notice under Article 50 TEU that the UK wishes to leave the European Union unless the British Parliament has authorized this. The prerogative powers of the Prime Minister do not extend to domestic regulation or deregulation, which would be the inevitable effect of withdrawal from the UK. The decision was received with horror by those in favour of Brexit, who feared that Parliament may attempt to impose conditions on the process and achieve a soft, or even half-Brexit. This seems in fact unlikely, and the Court's affirmation of the sovereignty of Parliament is an unlikely focus for nationalist ire. In any case, the decision may be amended or overturned on appeal, with a decision of the Supreme Court expected soon. This note looks at the judgment of the High Court, the constitutional logic behind it, and its possible consequences.

Abstract licence: CC BY-NC-ND

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