Thought and Being are the Same: Categorial Rendition of the Parmenidian Thesis
Egorychev Ilya
Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric · 2016
doi:10.1515/slgr-2016-0040 (opens in a new tab)
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Abstract
Classic understanding of logic as an instrument of cognition, which, in effect, pertain rather to human’s mind than to reality itself, gives rise to the fundamental mapping problem of reconciliation of this reality with any possible practices of its representations in thought. In other words, it is essentially not the same thing that can be thought and that can be. However, after unusual and highly abstract (essentially geometric) Grothendieck constructions gave rise to so called categorial analysis of logic, it became possible to show, that (up to categorial equivalence) Parmenides after all was right.
Abstract licence: CC BY
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