Skip to content
naulon
Not checkedNot checked for notices yet.

Process Metaphysics of Consciousness

Prentner Robert

Open Philosophy · 2018

doi:10.1515/opphil-2018-0002 (opens in a new tab)

We email you when a new notice or a question about this paper appears.

Abstract

In this article, we look at the hard problem of consciousness from the perspective of process metaphysics. We thereby identify three problematic premises of the problem that pertain to the constitution of consciousness and its causal relation to the world. We argue for the necessity of re-thinking the corresponding phenomena in terms of internally-structured processes. The hard problem would then cease to be an insurmountable obstacle to a science of consciousness. Furthermore, this line of reasoning is shown to be continuous with philosophical projects from the early 20th century that preceded the contemporary philosophy of mind. Specifically, we investigate the relationship of parts and wholes, and translate metaphysical problems of consciousness into mereological language. Despite this being a philosophical project, we frequently note and discuss links to the empirical sciences, in particular those of quantum mechanics, systems theory and the embodied cognition framework.

Abstract licence: CC BY

Reads

Read by people on this page

None yet.

Checked or read by AI through naulon

None yet.

A person counts once a day per paper. We keep no cookie and no address: a reader is a hash that changes every day. Any month under five reads shows no number.

Are you an author?

Is this your paper?

Claim it to add your note and be paid when agents cite it. Free.