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Hypercompetition & Fiscal Attractiveness

Rougé Jean-François, Chopov Borislav

ECONOMICS · 2016

doi:10.1515/eoik-2017-0007 (opens in a new tab)

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Abstract

Hypercompetition is at the very center of modern economies. As a consequence, both states and enterprises have been heavily engaged in an amoral power game (Colonomos, 2005) based exclusively on strength where tax systems have a prominent role. An obscure fiscal war takes place firstly between states seeking to increase their attractiveness. On the other hand, firms fight against states to optimize their revenues. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to discuss the components and the implications of the competition between states expressed through the establishment of tax havens and the launch of merciless fiscal policies. At the same time, enterprises try to shape the existing laws in a manner that favors their interests, using also aggressive fiscal strategies.

Abstract licence: CC BY-NC-ND

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