Central bank communication, shadow banking, and bank risk-taking: Theoretical model and PVAR empirical evidence.

The rapid development of Chinese shadow banking, which relies on the banking system, significantly impacts nonneutral bank risk-taking. Central bank communication also plays a vital role in risk prevention and mitigation in the banking system in a modern central banking system. To address the issues of central bank communication, shadow banking, and bank risk-taking, we construct a new theoretical model that includes shadow banking based on the M-S model. Based on the central bank written communication index measured by the Monetary Policy Implementation Report 2009-2019 and balanced panel data of 35 listed banks, we design an empirical PVAR model. This study finds that central bank communication regarding domestic easing economy and policy positively affects bank risk-taking, while central bank communication and mechanism exists in China. Moreover, the growth rate of shadow banking size also positively encourages bank risk-taking. Furthermore, central bank communication regarding foreign policy is negatively related to bank risk-taking in the robustness test, supporting the above findings. The analysis of equity heterogeneity shows that the positive effect of central bank communication on bank risk-taking in shadow banking is more pronounced in small and medium-sized shareholdings. Further analyzing the economic consequences of central bank communication and shadow banking on bank risk-taking, we find that banks' risk-taking positively affects their share of noninterest income and total asset size.

Abstract licence: CC BY

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