Research on evolutionary game of environmental accounting information disclosure from the perspective of multi-agent.

In the past, China, like other developing countries in the world, pursued the goal of rapid economic development at the expense of ecology and ignored the issue of environmental protection. But in recent decades, as environmental problems have become increasingly prominent, developing countries have begun to explore ways to coordinate economy and ecological environment. As the largest developing country, China has been actively exploring ecological governance plans, putting forward the concept of green development, setting the goal of building a "beautiful China" and placing the construction of ecological civilization in the ontological status of social systems and national goals. In order to accelerate the green development process of enterprises in developing countries, based on the actual situation in China, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of environmental accounting information disclosure with enterprises, investors and media as the research objects, and analyzes the internal mechanism of environmental accounting information disclosure. The model finds that the equilibrium of the three parties is affected by multiple factors. Therefore, this study further uses system dynamics to explore the dynamic process of evolutionary games and the strategic choices among multiple agents, and explore the mechanism of three types of agents to promote environmental accounting information disclosure. The simulation results reveal that government incentives have a greater impact on guiding enterprises and the media to evolve in the direction of legal disclosure and participation in exposure strategies. In addition, the continuous reduction of the cumbersome degree of disclosure procedures and the difficulty of improving environmental performance can fundamentally promote companies to actively choose legal disclosure strategies, which will help improve the quality of environmental accounting information disclosure, boost investor confidence, and enhance government supervision.

Abstract licence: CC BY

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