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Correction: The Structure of Mutations and the Evolution of Cooperation.
Julián García, Arne Traulsen
PLoS ONE · 2012
doi:10.1371/annotation/7f22fd68-23bf-4c4e-a091-a92090e9314b (opens in a new tab)
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Abstract
Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations assumes that all mutations are equally likely, i.e., if there are n strategies a single mutation can result in any strategy with probability 1=n.However, in biological systems it seems natural that not all mutations can arise from a given state.Certain mutations may be far away, or even be unreachable given the current composition of an evolving population.These distances between strategies (or genotypes) define a topology of mutations that so far has been neglected in evolutionary game theory.In this paper we re-evaluate classic results in the evolution of cooperation departing from the assumption of uniform mutations.We examine two cases: the evolution of reciprocal strategies in a repeated prisoner's dilemma, and the evolution of altruistic punishment in a public goods game.In both cases, alternative but reasonable mutation kernels shift known results in the direction of less cooperation.We therefore show that assuming uniform mutations has a substantial impact on the fate of an evolving population.Our results call for a reassessment of the ''model-less'' approach to mutations in evolutionary dynamics.
Abstract licence: CC BY
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