Skip to content
naulon
Not checkedNot checked for notices yet.

Grøstl Distinguishing Attack: A New Rebound Attack of an AES-like Permutation

Victor Cauchois, Clément Gomez, Reynald Lercier

IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology · 2017

doi:10.13154/tosc.v2017.i3.1-23 (opens in a new tab)

We email you when a new notice or a question about this paper appears.

Abstract

We consider highly structured truncated differential paths to mount a new rebound attack on Grøstl-512, a hash functions based on two AES-like permutations, P1024 and Q1024, with non-square input and output registers. We explain how such differential paths can be computed using a Mixed-Integer Linear Programming approach. Together with a SuperSBox description, this allows us to build a rebound attack with a 6-round inbound phase whereas classical rebound attacks have 4-round inbound phases. This yields the first distinguishing attack on a 11-round version of P1024 and Q1024 with about 272 computations and a memory complexity of about 256 bytes, to be compared with the 296 computations required by the corresponding generic attack. Previous best results on this permutation reached 10 rounds with a computational complexity of about 2392 operations, to be compared with the 2448 computations required by the corresponding generic attack.

Abstract licence: CC BY

Reads

Read by people on this page

None yet.

Checked or read by AI through naulon

None yet.

A person counts once a day per paper. We keep no cookie and no address: a reader is a hash that changes every day. Any month under five reads shows no number.

Are you an author?

Is this your paper?

Claim it to add your note and be paid when agents cite it. Free.