The Imperative of Reputation Between Social and Moral Norms
Gian Paolo Terravecchia
Phenomenology and Mind · 2017
doi:10.13128/phe_mi-22441 (opens in a new tab)
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Abstract
For the philosophy of normativity, the study of reputation helps a better understanding of the conflict that may arise between social and moral norms. It is a conflict which has been discussed in recent years and which has never been treated specifically from this perspective before. The paper discusses the dilemma, firstly showing its roots and meanings and secondly giving the reasons to choose one of the alternatives. This helps to show the normative conflict between social and moral norms and to explore its complexity, presenting some solutions. In so doing, the ontology of reputation is developed and discussed, also by presenting and discussing the two forms of the imperative of reputation.
Abstract licence: CC BY-NC-ND
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