Dependence and Fundamentality
Justin Zylstra
Studia Philosophica Estonica · 2014
doi:10.12697/spe.2014.7.2.02 (opens in a new tab)
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Abstract
I argue that dependence is neither necessary nor sufficient for relative fundamentality. I then introduce the notion of 'likeness in nature' and provide an account of relative fundamentality in terms of it and the notion of dependence. Finally, I discuss some puzzles that arise in Aristotle's Categories, to which the theory developed is applied.
Abstract licence: CC BY-NC-ND
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