Bonheur et unification des vertus chez Aristote
Carlo Natali
Revista de Filosofia Antiga · 2007
doi:10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v1i1p1-24 (opens in a new tab)
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Abstract
The main problem studied here is the Aristotelian doctrine of the unity of virtues. Aristotle accepts a variety of virtues, moral and intellectual, and has consequently to contend with the problem of their occasionally being disconnected from one another. He has different strategies to deal with this problem; in Eudemian Ethics, he unites them by particular and psychological ways, whereas in Nicomachean Ethics their unity is mainly brought about by their connection to the perfect and best life. The unification works at various levels: in Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle is mainly interested in unifying the virtues of character, whereas in Eudemian Ethics he unifies all virtues in the concept of kalokagathia. These different strategies do not call for a genetic explanation, for they are all compatible with one another; in fact, they make more noticeable several aspects of the same problem.
Abstract licence: CC BY
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