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Psychological Resilience: An Affect-Regulation Framework
Allison S. Troy, Emily C. Willroth, Amanda J. Shallcross and 3 more (opens in a new tab)
Annual Review of Psychology · 2023 · Review
doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-020122-041854 (opens in a new tab)
Abstract
Exposure to adversity (e.g., poverty, bereavement) is a robust predictor of disruptions in psychological functioning. However, people vary greatly in their responses to adversity; some experience severe long-term disruptions, others experience minimal disruptions or even improvements. We refer to the latter outcomes—faring better than expected given adversity—as psychological resilience. Understanding what processes explain resilience has critical theoretical and practical implications. Yet, psychology's understanding of resilience is incomplete, for two reasons: ( a) We lack conceptual clarity, and ( b) two major approaches to resilience—the stress and coping approach and the emotion and emotion-regulation approach—have limitations and are relatively isolated from one another. To address these two obstacles,we first discuss conceptual questions about resilience. Next, we offer an integrative affect-regulation framework that capitalizes on complementary strengths of both approaches. This framework advances our understanding of resilience by integrating existing findings, highlighting gaps in knowledge, and guiding future research.
Full text
From PubMed Central, U.S. National Library of Medicine, as current on Oct 19, 2026. Paragraph numbers are ours, so an answer can point at one.
INTRODUCTION
Exposure to adversity—circumstances such as poverty or life events such as job loss, serious injury, or bereavement—is a robust predictor of disruptions in psychological functioning. Importantly, however, people vary greatly in the extent to which exposure to adversity leads to such disruptions: While some people experience severe long-term disruptions, others show few or no long-term disruptions, or even improvement. Take, for example, two people who lose a loved one. After initial shock and grief, one person might continue to feel strong distress, hopelessness, and depression lasting several years. In contrast, a second person might experience the same initial shock and grief in the weeks following the loss; yet, they might soon begin to recover and, within some months, experience sadness but no lasting depression, and even feel an increased sense of meaning and life satisfaction. We refer to the latter outcomes—faring better than would be expected in a given cultural context—as psychological resilience.
What psychological processes explain resilience? Answers to this question are of significant theoretical importance in that they advance our basic understanding of the vast range of responses that people exhibit to adversity. In addition, given that adversity is an unavoidable fact of human life that places staggering burdens on individuals and societies, answers to this question have enormous practical importance inasmuch as they point to targets for increasing resilience. In the past few decades, psychological research on the processes that explain resilience has come from two major sources: the stress and coping approach and the emotion and emotion-regulation approach, henceforth referred to as the coping approach and the emotion-regulation approach, respectively. Each approach has yielded important insights. However, our understanding of resilience has been limited by two key obstacles. First, research on resilience has been slowed by lack of conceptual clarity. Second, the coping and emotion-regulation approaches each have limitations, and there has been a relative lack of cross-talk between the two. We address each of these obstacles in turn.
First, to contribute to conceptual clarity, we review six core questions encountered in research on resilience and provide an overview of the conceptual space by considering various ways these questions could be answered. We then locate our own approach within this conceptual space. Second, to integrate and build on the coping and the emotion-regulation approaches, we adopt an affect-regulation framework. This framework capitalizes on the complementary strengths of the coping and emotion-regulation approaches, organizes past findings, identifies gaps in existing knowledge, and helps guide future research.
CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS IN RESILIENCE
As noted by others, “the theoretical and research literature on resilience reflects little consensus about definitions, with substantial variations in operationalization and measurement of key constructs” (, p. 544; see also,, ). Increasing conceptual clarity helps to resolve disagreements, summarize and synthesize research findings, identify the best methods and measures for particular research questions, identify crucial gaps in understanding and important next steps for research, and develop theories to programmatically articulate and test new hypotheses. To further these goals, we begin by laying out the conceptual space of resilience.
The Conceptual Space of Resilience
In Table 1, we delineate six key questions that researchers encounter when thinking about resilience, possible answers to these questions, and how we have answered these questions.
The first question focuses on the level of analysis for resilience: As indicated in the first row of Table 1, the level of analysis can be individuals, groups (e.g., a family), and communities (e.g., a neighborhood, city, or country). While psychological research on resilience has often focused on individuals, there is increasing attention to groups and communities. Although these levels interact with and influence one another, resilience at one level does not imply resilience at another level (cf. ). Thus, an increasing number of researchers have adopted a systems approach, which involves conceptualizing resilience as the dynamic interplay among individual, family, and community levels.
The second question concerns the role of adversity in resilience. As shown in the second row of Table 1, this question can be answered in a number of ways. In some cases, resilience is conceptualized as a relatively stable trait that is present and measurable even in the absence of adversity. In other cases, resilience is thought to occur only in response to adversity; that is, some type of adversity must be experienced to observe resilience. When adversity is considered, it needs to be defined. This is all the more necessary given that there are deep differences in how this can be done. One of the most consequential distinctions is between defining adversity in objective terms (e.g., events such as poverty, disaster, bereavement;, ) versus subjective terms (e.g., individuals’ appraisals that an event was adverse;, ). Additionally, adversity can vary along dimensions such as intensity, timing, duration, controllability, globality, threat, and deprivation and across types of events (e.g., bereavement, trauma; ), and we have to be clear about these distinctions and whether they matter. In sum, what constitutes or predicts resilience in one context may not do the same in another.
As shown in the third row of Table 1, the third question focuses on the nature of resilience (see ). Three main conceptualizations have been offered. First, resilience can be considered as a factor, or a relatively stable trait, that exists both in the presence and in the absence of adversity. For example, trait resilience has been conceptualized as the stable predisposition to adapt to change. Second, resilience can be considered as a process or a set of processes, such as capacities or resources that are deployed in response to adversity and allow individuals to withstand ongoing demands and maintain functioning. As described by, resilience processes can include social (e.g., social support) and psychological (e.g., cognitive and behavioral strategies, including coping and emotion regulation) aspects. Third, resilience can be considered as an outcome, such as maintained or high functioning following adversity. In turn, functioning can be indicated in a variety of ways. At the level of the individual, indices of resilience include well-being; psychological health; levels of psychopathology; number of symptoms; presence of diagnoses; academic, occupational, or social achievements; or accomplishing developmental milestones. At the level of groups and communities, indices of resilience include social and economic infrastructure and resources relating to education and human development. Resilience established by one indicator (e.g., academic achievement) does not necessarily imply resilience established by another indicator (e.g., psychological health), and it is thus important to be clear about the indicator of functioning that is used.
Questions four through six (rows 4–6 of Table 1) concern the criteria by which resilience is established—that is, how we determine that an individual, group, or community is resilient. These three criteria-related questions can be understood in terms of a graph with a y-axis depicting functioning and an x-axis depicting time. We illustrate these questions in Figure 1 with regard to resilience outcomes, but they could be articulated for resilience factors or processes as well.
Question four (Table 1, row 4) asks what criterion for functioning is applied to determine resilience. In other words, at what point on the y-axis is an individual, group, or community considered resilient? A range of criteria could be used. First, one could set the criterion as meeting an absolute point such as scoring above or below a particular threshold (e.g., falling below the diagnostic criteria for posttraumatic stress disorder;, ). Alternatively, resilience could be conceptualized in relative terms, that is, as high functioning relative to others who experienced similar adversity, relative to others who did not experience adversity, relative to oneself (e.g., returning to one’s pre-adversity levels of functioning;, ), or relative to expectations given a particular cultural context and particular adversity. In each case, one can conceptualize resilience as categorical (e.g., resilient versus not resilient) or continuous (for discussions, see, ).
Questions five and six regard the x-axis, or, timing. As addressed in the fifth row of Table 1, first we need to ask what criterion for trajectory is applied to determine resilience. In other words, at what time point relative to adversity onset does resilience emerge? In some cases, such as in factor conceptualizations, resilience is thought to be observable at any point in time. If resilience is thought of as varying in time, one could decide that resilience must emerge during or immediately after encountering adversity. For example, to be resilient someone might have to exhibit greater functioning immediately after encountering adversity. At the other end of the continuum, one could presume that to be resilient, an individual, group, or community simply needs to show higher functioning at any point in their lives, which could be years or decades after experiencing adversity. For example, to be resilient someone might have to exhibit greater functioning 2 years after encountering adversity. As addressed in the sixth row of Table 1, we also need to ask what criterion for duration is applied to resilience. In other words, how long must indicators of resilience be present for someone to be considered resilient? There is a similarly wide range of possibilities here, ranging from a brief moment to years or even decades.
As Table 1 indicates, the key conceptual questions investigators encounter when thinking about resilience have been answered in a wide variety of ways. In our view, there is no single right answer; rather, one’s answers will depend on one’s research question and aims. However, it is crucial that researchers clearly state their position on each question. We summarize our own position in the third column of Table 1.
Our Conceptual Approach to Resilience
With regard to the first question (Table 1, row 1), we are interested in understanding how individuals adapt to adversity. Thus, our unit of analysis is the individual. However, we emphasize that all individuals are embedded within groups, communities, and cultural contexts that influence individual experiences and resilience, thus underscoring the importance of the interplay between different levels of analysis.
Next (Table 1, row 2), we conceptualize resilience as occurring in response to adversity. In turn, we define adversity as circumstances or events that many people in a given cultural context would expect to tax or exceed their resources and that have the potential to disrupt functioning. We focus on circumstances and events that are expected to disrupt functioning at least to a moderate extent and at least for a moderate amount of time (i.e., lasting a minimum of hours, days, or weeks). This definition of adversity (a) excludes events and circumstances that are very unlikely to affect functioning (e.g., a one-time, transient, mild event); (b) includes a wide range of circumstances and events (e.g., poverty, job loss, divorce, terrorist attacks, or global events such as the COVID-19 pandemic), including those that might not be considered adverse for all people and in all cultural contexts (e.g., a wedding, a move); (c) avoids concerns about circularity (i.e., adversity is what adversely affects a person) by using a consensus criterion rather than an individual-based subjective criterion; and (d) avoids the difficulty of establishing an entirely objective criterion by using people’s appraisals instead (i.e., what most people expect to potentially disrupt functioning). Thus, our definition of adversity is broad and allows for the examination of resilience across a wide range of adverse contexts. Lastly, we believe that particular features of adversity (e.g., intensity, timing, duration, controllability, and globality) shape resilience and thus need to be considered.
Third (Table 1, row 3), we focus on resilience as an outcome and are interested in which factors and processes predict resilience outcomes. In terms of which outcomes we consider, we focus on psychological health outcomes, which we characterize comprehensively along the dimensions of ill-being (e.g., depression) and well-being (e.g., life satisfaction). Thus, resilience can encompass lack of ill-being and/or presence of well-being.
In terms of applying a criterion for functioning (Table 1, row 4)—that is, where on the y-axis of Figure 1 one is considered to be resilient—we define resilience in relative terms, whereby a person exhibiting relatively little disruption in functioning is resilient. As depicted in the green shading of Figure 1, someone could exhibit high levels of psychological health, moderate levels of psychological health, or even some disruptions in psychological health and still be considered resilient because they exhibit less disruption than would be expected within a given cultural context for a particular adversity. This approach is based on the notion that cultural contexts differ in their understanding of what constitutes adversity and functioning. At the same time, this perspective is maximally inclusive of what is considered resilience, thus allowing us to speak to the maximum range of predictors of resilience. As indicated by the graded green and red backgrounds in Figure 1, we assume people to fall along a continuum of more versus less resilient outcomes rather than into discrete types. This expectation is driven by the observation that psychological health indicators (e.g., depression, satisfaction with life) are generally best described as continua.
Last, we consider when resilience outcomes must first appear relative to adversity onset (Table 1, row 5) and for how long they must be present (Table 1, row 6). Here we adopt a broad view, which allows us to be inclusive in our consideration of resilience. More specifically, in our view, resilience can first emerge during, immediately after, or any time after the onset of adversity. Most (but not all) people experience an initial, and at times prolonged, decrease in psychological health after experiencing adversity, and this initial decrease in health does not preclude the possibility of resilience according to our criteria. In terms of duration, we define resilience as a relatively lasting outcome (e.g., absence of lasting depression) rather than a short-term one (e.g., absence of transient depressed mood). While there is no discrete boundary defining what constitutes a lasting outcome (as indicated by the graded shading in Figure 1), an outcome should last at least 1 week to be distinguished from, for instance, a transient mood.
PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO EXPLAINING RESILIENCE
Now that we have reviewed the conceptual space of resilience and made explicit our location in it, we turn to the primary question that motivates this article: What psychological processes explain resilience? Two major research approaches have provided important insights into this question: the stress and coping approach and the emotion and emotion-regulation approach. We next describe each approach, highlighting their unique features, contributions, and limitations. We then present an affect-regulation framework that integrates the two approaches.
The Stress and Coping Approach
Research on coping with stress was guided by the pioneering work of Lazarus, Folkman, and others, who emphasized the transactions between the person and the environment., p. 19) defined stress as the “relationship between the person and the environment that is appraised by the person as taxing or exceeding [their] resources and endangering [their] well-being.” This highlights the idea that aspects of an individual (i.e., appraisal) interact with aspects of the environment (i.e., a stressor), and together they give rise to stress responses (changes in subjective experience, cognition, behavior, and physiology; ). When encountering stressors, people often engage in coping, “a person’s ongoing efforts in thought and action” to manage stressors and stress responses (, p. 8). From this perspective, to explain resilience we must understand what constitutes adaptive coping.
Four key features, summarized in Table 2, characterize research following the coping approach. The first feature is grounded in a stress framework, from which stems a naturalistic perspective that aims to capture the richness of people’s stressors and their responses to them. While early research involved experiments in animals in order to delineate the biological underpinnings of the stress response (for a review, see ), contemporary research has examined a wide range of real-world stressors such as chronic illness and caregiving (e.g., ), bereavement (e.g., ), and natural disasters (e.g., ) outside the laboratory. Within this stress framework, individuals’ stress responses are typically conceived of as negative in valence and encompassing multiple response domains including experience, behavior, cognition, and physiology. In addition, the coping approach has often examined both psychological (e.g., affective experience) as well as biological (e.g., immune function, hormones) mechanisms of resilience outcomes. This approach has also examined the relationships between coping and a wide range of resilience outcomes, including psychological health (e.g., depression, well-being) and physical health (e.g., symptoms of illness; ).
The second key feature of the coping approach is its interest in comprehensively studying a wide range of real-world coping strategies. For example, one of the most commonly used measures, the Brief COPE, measures 13 different strategies. In their review, delineated 400 coping strategies that had been measured in research. Given how difficult it is to study and understand such a large number of strategies, researchers have sought to derive broader dimensions of coping. Although there is no final consensus on broader coping dimensions, three of the most commonly used classification systems include problem-focused versus emotion-focused coping (i.e., targeting a situation versus one’s emotions; ), approach versus avoidance coping (engaging actively with versus avoiding an adverse event; ), and cognitive versus behavioral coping (changing thoughts versus changing behaviors; ). Of these three, the distinction between problem-focused and emotion-focused coping is the most utilized; however, research in this area often emphasizes the idea that problem- and emotion-focused coping are not mutually exclusive.
A third key feature of the coping approach stems from its transactional view, whereby the context within which coping occurs is explicitly considered. This emphasis leads to the idea that no particular coping strategy is inherently adaptive or maladaptive. Instead, the adaptiveness of coping strategies is shaped by the context in which they are used, and resilience is more likely to occur when there is greater fit between specific features of the stressors and the type of coping deployed. For example, people who use problem-focused coping in response to relatively uncontrollable adversity report higher levels of psychological symptoms compared to those who use problem-focused coping in response to relatively controllable adversity. In these ways, the coping approach has emphasized the importance of context and has sought to characterize and empirically study its role in shaping resilience.
Fourth, methodologically, with some early exceptions (e.g., ), the methods used in coping research have typically followed its naturalistic emphasis on real-life stressors and responses to them, and they have often utilized field studies and self-report surveys to assess the naturalistic use of coping in response to stressors. Finally, the coping approach has relied on longitudinal studies that allow for the examination of long-term relationships between coping and resilience. Taken as a whole, this naturalistic approach has produced findings with high ecological validity that provide a rich view of how coping is linked with resilience across a wide variety of adverse events, coping strategies, mechanisms, and indicators of resilience.
At the same time, the coping approach has limitations. First, within the context of the stress framework, some have noted that defining stressors via individuals’ subjective appraisals can lead to tautology of stressor and stress response. In addition, the stress framework typically considers stressors and stress responses as being broadly negative in valence, while neglecting discrete emotional states. Second, while the broad categories of coping described above are comprehensive, they also contain heterogeneous coping strategies that may exert different short-term effects and, in turn, differentially predict resilience. In other words, the categories of, for example, problem- and emotion-focused coping might be too broad. At the same time, the potential differential effects of strategies within these broader categories have not been systematically and comprehensively examined, in part because different researchers have identified different strategies as important (see ) and have used different measures with different items and definitions, making them difficult to organize and synthesize. Thus, comprehensiveness and breadth result in trade-offs in terms of focus and specificity. Third, although the coping approach has yielded findings high in ecological validity, the use of correlational, self-report methods to assess coping can limit the internal validity of key findings and lacks precision regarding how processes unfold in time.
The Emotion and Emotion-Regulation Approach
The emotion-regulation approach emerged in the 1990s, in part as an outgrowth of the coping approach. Although debates about the definition of emotion remain, a consensus has emerged that defines emotion as a response to any stimulus involving a valuation (e.g., good for me or bad for me) that involves loosely coupled changes in subjective experience, cognition, behavior, and peripheral physiology that unfold over a relatively short period of time. Emotion regulation has been defined as attempts to influence which emotions people have, when they have them, and how they experience or express them. While the emotion-regulation approach is broad in terms of considering emotions across different situations and stimuli, this approach is relevant to resilience in that people regulate the emotions they experience in response to adversity, which, in turn, is heavily implicated in their functioning. From this perspective, to explain resilience we must understand what constitutes adaptive emotion regulation (e.g., ).
Four key features of the emotion-regulation approach are summarized in Table 2. First, its roots in an emotion framework lead this approach to consider both positively and negatively valenced emotional states; distinguish among discrete emotions such as happiness, sadness, and anxiety; and consider changes in multiple response domains that include experience, behavior, cognition, and physiology. In addition, this approach has typically considered the psychological mechanisms of resilience outcomes (e.g., affective experience; ), and has often examined resilience outcomes in terms of psychological health (e.g., depression, anxiety; ). The second key feature of the emotion-regulation approach is that it typically involves conceptually grounded distinctions among a relatively small number of well-defined families of emotion-regulation strategies. For example, the process model of emotion regulation distinguishes among families of emotion regulation based on which aspect of the emotion-generation process is targeted. According to the process model, emotional responses arise as the result of the particular features of a situation one encounters, of how one directs one’s attention toward or away from particular stimuli, and of how one appraises stimuli. From this perspective, each of the elements involved in generating an emotional response—situation, attention, appraisals—and the emotional response itself can become targets for emotion regulation. Situation change involves choosing or avoiding situations (referred to as situation selection) as well as altering situations (referred to as situation modification). Attentional deployment involves directing one’s attention toward or away from particular features of a situation. Cognitive change involves changing one’s interpretations or appraisals of a situation. Finally, response modification involves changing one’s emotional response (including its behavioral, experiential, and physiological components) once the emotional response has begun to unfold. Importantly, the process model of emotion regulation allows one to categorize emotion-regulation families and to make predictions about their short-term consequences and longer-term correlates with functioning. Thus, the emotion-regulation approach has generated knowledge high in specificity and focuses on a small number of conceptually derived strategies.
A third key feature of the emotion-regulation approach emerges in contrast to the coping approach and its emphasis on transactions with the context. Instead, this approach has typically focused on understanding the main effects of particular emotion-regulation strategies on key outcomes without explicitly considering the context. In particular, this approach has studied the effects of emotion regulation with regard to a wide range of outcomes such as subjective experience, behavior, physiology, well-being, health, and relationship outcomes. This focus has led to an emphasis on understanding main effects of particular regulatory strategies at the individual level, such as when benefits of reappraisal in general are contrasted to the disadvantages of suppression in general, without explicitly considering context.
Fourth, with some exceptions (e.g.,, ), emotion-regulation researchers emphasize experimental designs and laboratory approaches to examine the causal effects of particular emotion-regulation strategies. These investigations have included measures of self-reported experience of emotions as well as autonomic-physiological, neural, behavioral, social, and peer-rated responses, and they often examine temporally fine-grained dynamic processes. Taken together, these studies constitute a corpus of findings high in internal validity and temporal precision, which allow researchers to draw causal conclusions about the short-term effects of particular regulatory strategies on a wide range of outcomes.
The emotion-regulation approach also has limitations. First, there has been much less consideration of real-life adversity, limiting ecological validity. In addition, while many studies have examined psychological health as a key outcome, there has been much less consideration of physical health outcomes in comparison with the coping approach (cf. ). Second, although the process model can in theory accommodate a large number of emotion-regulation strategies, there has been a narrower empirical emphasis on reappraisal and suppression, often to the exclusion of other emotion-regulation strategies such as situation change, which limits comprehensiveness and breadth. Similarly, relatively fewer studies have examined spontaneously deployed (rather than instructed) emotion-regulation strategies outside of the laboratory (for recent exceptions, see, ). Third, there has historically been less emphasis on understanding transactions between emotion regulation and context, with little research explicitly considering adversity and interactions with features of adversity (cf.,, ). Although recently there has been a growing emphasis on the importance of context, this recognition has appeared primarily in theorizing, with empirical work lagging behind. Fourth, because the emotion-regulation approach has emphasized the immediate consequences of specific regulatory strategies, there have been relatively fewer investigations of the longer-term implications of emotion regulation.
An Integrative Affect-Regulation Framework for Resilience
Although the coping and emotion-regulation approaches have been critical in generating insights into resilience, each approach has its limitations. Compounding these limitations, there has been little cross-talk between the two approaches. Indeed, over two decades ago,, p. 35) wrote: “Scholars and scientists concerned with stress and coping research and theory tend not to know or cite emotion research and theory, and vice versa. This separation of fields is an absurdity.” The persistence of this problem has led to siloing that has slowed the generation, consolidation, and application of knowledge about resilience.
One path forward is to integrate these approaches and unite the two research communities by building on their shared theoretical foundations. Critically, both approaches are grounded in the idea that affect is a crucial aspect of people’s responses to adversity and a key part of what makes adversity potentially harmful. Affect has been defined as any response to an internal or external stimulus that involves valuation (e.g., “Is this good for me or bad for me?”). Affect is thus a superordinate concept that includes stress responses and emotions, as well as other phenomena such as impulses and mood. Furthermore, both approaches rest on the notion that, although affective responses to adversity can intuitively appear overwhelming and unalterable, they rarely—if ever —simply happen to people. In fact, according to both approaches, people engage in efforts to change the adversity they encounter and their affective responses to it: They regulate their affect. In turn, affect regulation (a superordinate term that includes both coping and emotion regulation, among others) provides a key to explaining resilience: Affect regulation allows people to agentically change how they respond to adversity and the trajectory they are on, either away from or toward resilience (see Figure 1).
The view that (a) both coping and emotion regulation are types of affect regulation and (b) affect regulation is a key to explaining resilience allows us to integrate the coping and the emotion-regulation approaches. By adopting an integrative affect-regulation framework, we can draw upon the unique strengths of both approaches. For example, we can adopt the coping approach’s strong naturalistic emphasis on understanding real-world adversity and transactions with context, while also leveraging the important contributions of the process model of emotion regulation and its emphasis on conceptually derived families of regulation. This framework organizes and consolidates existing empirical insights and guides future research that capitalizes on the strengths of both approaches, leading to increased collaboration across approaches and more comprehensive knowledge. Below, we describe three key features of an integrative affect-regulation framework, including that it (a) distinguishes among conceptually motivated affect-regulation strategies, (b) delineates profiles of short-term consequences of these strategies in multiple domains, and (c) predicts the longer-term implications of each strategy for resilience based on its profile of short-term consequences as well as the context in which it is used (see Figure 2).
First, drawing on the emotion-regulation approach, we distinguish among families of affect-regulation strategies based on which aspect of the affect-generation process they target. Thus, we distinguish four families of affect-regulation strategies: situation change, attentional deployment, cognitive change, and response modulation. These distinctions make it possible to capture important differences in short-term consequences as well as in implications for resilience without being so nuanced as to be unmanageable.
Second, as indicated in Figure 2, drawing on both approaches, we characterize affect-regulation strategies in terms of their short-term consequences for multiple domains that, accumulating over time, have critical implications for resilience. These include the domains of affective experience (including both negative and positive affective experiences;,, ), affective behavior, autonomic physiology, social processes (including social responsiveness, closeness, connection, liking, social support, and satisfaction with interactions;,, ), cognitive effort (the amount of effort needed to implement an affect-regulation strategy; ), and engagement (awareness of, behavioral engagement with, and learning from adversity; ). To explain resilience, we must consider more than a single type of short-term consequence. To date, much of the research on short-term consequences has focused on affective experience. This limits what we know about other types of short-term consequences (e.g., behavior, engagement) as well as about how profiles of multiple short-term consequences jointly shape resilience. For example, if a situation-change strategy decreases the experience of negative affect but at the same time impairs social processes, this strategy could, on the whole, decrease resilience. Thus, a critical point of the integrative framework is that it is the profile of multiple short-term consequences, rather than a single type alone, that determines resilience, with different types of short-term consequences interacting with or counteracting one another.
Another critical point is that the framework distinguishes between short-term consequences and resilience. The distinction between short-term consequences and resilience outcomes can appear somewhat blurry, as is the case when a cognitive-change strategy produces repeated episodes of positive affective experience. However, short-term consequences and resilience differ in two important ways. First, they differ in timescale. Short-term means that the consequences play out on the level of minutes to hours, as a direct consequence of an instance of affect regulation. This is distinct from resilience outcomes, which can begin to emerge at any time after the onset of adversity but must last 1 week or longer to allow us to speak of an outcome rather than a transient state (i.e., a period of stable and relatively high satisfaction with life rather than a momentary positive affect). Second, the two differ conceptually such that, as indicated next, a particular short-term consequence might lead to resilience in one context but not in another.
A third key feature of the integrative framework draws on the naturalistic perspective of the coping approach and its emphasis on the transaction between the person and the situation (see Figure 2). Based on this idea, the use of affect-regulation strategies, their short-term consequences, and the relationships between affect regulation and resilience all depend on the context. As depicted in Figure 2, context can be considered in two ways. First, more narrowly, we can consider features of adversity (as shown in the darker gray box of Figure 2). These include intensity (e.g., from low-intensity events to life-threatening trauma; ), timing and duration (i.e., early versus later in life, acute versus chronic; ), controllability (how much one can influence whether and how an event unfolds;, ), globality of life domains affected by the adversity (e.g., work, family, health, finances; ), and dimensions of threat and deprivation. As depicted in Figure 2, these features of adversity can influence affect regulation, the short-term consequences of affect regulation, and the relationships between affect regulation and resilience.
Beyond features of adversity, features of the context more broadly also play a foundational role. The broader context can be understood as a person’s culture, society, community, social group (e.g., based on race, gender, age, or socioeconomic status), and family as well as the affordances, practices, values, and beliefs they engender. The broader context is relevant to resilience in that, as depicted in Figure 2 by the larger box that encompasses all other aspects of our framework, it powerfully shapes the adverse events people experience as well as affect regulation, the short-term consequences of affect regulation, and its implications for resilience, and it also determines what constitutes adversity and resilience in the first place. These effects are generated by influences of the context on affordances (e.g., are people compelled to suppress their affect?), practices (e.g., which affect-regulation strategies do people use?), values (e.g., do people value affect expression?), and beliefs (e.g., do people believe they can change their affect?) relating to affect regulation. Thus, in addition to features of adversity, the broader context is another important layer that can powerfully influence all aspects of affect regulation and its links with resilience, leading to three-way interactions in which the broader context can interact with both adversity and affect regulation to shape resilience.
In sum, the integrative affect-regulation framework considers a comprehensive range of conceptually derived affect-regulation strategies. In the integrative affect-regulation framework, the effects of affect-regulation strategies on resilience cannot be understood solely through their short-term consequences in a single domain, and they are not inherently good or bad for resilience. Instead, whether a strategy increases or decreases resilience is determined by the profile of its short-term consequences in conjunction with features of adversity and the broader context. Next, we review recent empirical findings that illustrate this framework.
AN AFFECT-REGULATION FRAMEWORK FOR RESILIENCE: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
In this selective review, we survey recent findings that speak to the affect-regulation framework and illustrate how the framework can be useful in organizing existing findings. We consider both correlational and experimental research from both the coping and the emotion-regulation approaches. For each family of affect-regulation strategies, we highlight one strategy that has received ample empirical attention. Although affect-regulation strategies can be used with the goal of increasing or decreasing either negative or positive affect, to date, the vast majority of research has focused on decreasing negative or increasing positive affect. This is thus our primary focus in our review. For each strategy, we review short-term consequences for affective experiences and social processes. We focus on these two domains (rather than behavior, autonomic physiology, cognitive effort, or engagement) because they have received particular attention. After reviewing short-term consequences, we review implications for resilience. At times, when little or no evidence is available that explicitly examines the affect-regulation strategy in the context of adversity, we rely on research that examines implications for psychological health in general, making the assumption that greater psychological health implies greater resilience. We conclude each section by illustrating how features of adversity and the broader context moderate the relationship between affect regulation and resilience, selecting one example in each case.
Situation Change
Situation change acts on the affect-eliciting situation to change its impact. For example, one can attend a close friend’s birthday party (situation selection) to increase experience of positive affect or can avoid talking to one’s ex-romantic partner at the party (situation modification) to reduce experience of negative affect. The expression “situation change” maps largely onto what is referred to as problem-focused or active coping—types of coping that involve modifying the source of adversity.
Short-term consequences of situation change.
Past investigations and a meta-analysis have shown that situation change can be used effectively to decrease the experience of negative affect and increase the experience of positive affect. In terms of social processes, situation change does not appear to have consistent effects. On the one hand, situation-change strategies can enhance processes such as social support, social connectedness, and closeness (e.g., bringing a friend to a stressful work event; ); on the other hand, they could harm social processes (e.g., choosing not to attend a stressful work event and thus socially isolating). Thus, while in principle situation change can be very beneficial to social processes, this is not necessarily so.
Situation change and resilience.
Many individual studies have found that engaging in situation change is critically tied to psychological health, including after adversity (e.g.,, ). However, meta-analyses have demonstrated mixed results. One meta-analysis of 42 studies found a positive association between problem solving, a key form of situation change, and psychological health. However, a separate meta-analysis of a different set of 34 studies found that the association depends on the specific type of situation change, with general efforts to change the situation being associated with better psychological health and hostile or aggressive efforts to change the situation being associated with worse psychological health. Even within studies that used the same operationalization of situation change, meta-analytic associations were small, with some studies reporting positive associations, some finding no associations, and some finding negative associations between situation change and psychological health.
These inconsistent findings suggest that the relationship between situation change and resilience is moderated by features of the context. The controllability of one’s adverse situation has been theorized to be particularly important in this regard. After all, attempts to alter an uncontrollable situation are by definition unlikely to succeed and might lead to frustration and hopelessness. Consistent with this idea, situation change has been associated with increased resilience in relatively controllable adversity. In contrast, in relatively uncontrollable adversity, situation change either is not significantly associated with resilience or is associated with decreased resilience. A recent systematic review found support for controllability as a moderator of the association between situation change and resilience in 9 out of 14 studies.
Attentional Deployment
Attentional deployment is defined as changing the way one directs one’s attention in order to change one’s affect. One particular form of attentional deployment that has received a great deal of empirical attention is distraction, which involves shifting attention away from one aspect of a situation (or thought) toward another. For example, one could browse the Internet for funny videos rather than thinking about an unsettling event that just happened. The coping literature has examined distraction as part of the broader category of disengagement (versus engagement) coping.
Short-term consequences of attentional deployment.
Laboratory studies examining the short-term effects of distraction support the idea that this strategy consistently decreases negative affective experiences and increases positive affective experiences in both clinical and nonclinical samples. While the link between distraction and social processes has received relatively little empirical attention, work showing a negative association between experiential avoidance and social engagement suggests that distraction may also impede social processes, given that distraction can be considered a form of experiential avoidance. However, there is some evidence that particular forms of distraction, such as spending time with friends, can maintain or even improve social processes.
Attentional deployment and resilience.
While distraction allows people to decrease negative and increase positive affective experiences and may (in some specific cases) maintain social processes in the short term, on average, distraction appears to be negatively associated with resilience. Repeated use of avoidance strategies such as distraction is linked to impaired psychological health, including depression, perhaps because these strategies do not involve resolution of the underlying cause of adversity. Experimental studies have shown that, although distraction decreases negative affective experiences in the short term, these benefits disappear or even reverse over time. This suggests that distraction may provide emotional relief in the short term but decrease resilience in the longer term.
The finding that distraction might have short-term but not longer-term benefits dovetails with findings that using distraction flexibly (rather than chronically and consistently) is associated with increased resilience. Both findings point to the idea that temporal aspects of adversity may shape the effects of distraction on resilience. Specifically, acute or single instances of adversity may be more suitable for distraction compared to more chronic or recurring instances of adversity. For example, when using distraction in response to one instance of a distressing stimulus, people show lower-intensity negative affective responses. However, when re-exposed to stimuli previously encountered while using distraction, people’s negative affective experiences increase. When examining resilience outcomes more specifically, research indicates that briefly distracting and garnering positivity in the immediate aftermath of adversity may increase resilience, perhaps by allowing people to take a break from a temporally bound, intense affective response. On the other hand, the use of distraction in response to chronic or recurring events may decrease resilience, perhaps because it reduces vigilance and impedes problem solving. These ideas remain largely theoretical and require further empirical investigation.
Cognitive Change
The most commonly studied cognitive-change strategy is reappraisal (also referred to as cognitive reappraisal, positive reappraisal, or benefit finding), which involves reframing or reconstruing an emotional situation in order to change one’s affect. Take, for example, one’s partner asking for a divorce, which an individual might initially appraise as an overpowering event that will devastate their own and their children’s lives. Alternatively, one might see it as painful but as something that can bring new opportunities to forge a new and healthier relationship.
Short-term consequences of cognitive change.
In their influential work, Lazarus and Folkman argued that it is not primarily a stressful event itself but rather one’s interpretation, or appraisal, of an event that leads to a stress response. From this perspective, reappraisal should allow people to successfully change or even completely transform their affective experiences. These hypotheses about reappraisal’s effects on affective experience have received substantial empirical support from both experimental and correlational studies, and meta-analyses on this topic confirm that the use of reappraisal is associated with decreased experience of negative affect and increased experience of positive affect.
A growing body of evidence also reveals that reappraisal has beneficial impacts on social processes. When instructed to use reappraisal during a negative affect induction in the lab, people are able to maintain social responsiveness with a conversation partner and show increased forgiveness in response to a relational offense. Furthermore, those who habitually use reappraisal more (versus less) are rated as more likeable and have closer friendships, and the instructed use of reappraisal was associated with fewer disagreements and less relationship aggression in romantic couples during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Cognitive change and resilience.
Given the pattern of short-term consequences described above, it may not be surprising that reappraisal is associated with increased resilience. For example, correlational studies have shown that reappraisal is associated with maintained or even increased psychological health following a variety of adverse events. More recent studies conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic additionally show that the use of reappraisal is associated with increased resilience, including lower levels of ill-being and higher levels of well-being.
Importantly, however, context appears to moderate the link between reappraisal and resilience. In particular, the controllability of the adversity one encounters has received attention. Multiple investigations have documented that reappraisal is associated with increased resilience in relatively uncontrollable adversity but shows no or even negative associations with resilience in response to relatively controllable adversity. These patterns may occur because people who reappraise a controllable situation are able to decrease their experience of negative affect, which may decrease one’s motivation to take direct action to change a controllable situation. Indeed, recent studies confirm that reappraisal could disrupt taking political action during an election and health-related behaviors during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Response Modulation
Response-modulation strategies target one’s affective responses, including affective behavior (e.g., facial, body, or vocal behavior), subjective affective experience, and physiology. Research on response modulation has focused primarily on suppression of behavior—for example, adopting a neutral facial expression to prevent one’s boss from seeing that one is angry. Thus, we focus on this form of response modulation in our review, using the term “expressive suppression”.
Short-term consequences of response modulation.
A meta-analysis of experimental studies reveals a large effect size of expressive suppression on expressive behavior but no consistent effect on the experience of negative affect. Additional correlational and experience-sampling studies with higher ecological validity indicate that expressive suppression not only is ineffective for decreasing experience of negative affect but also may reduce the experience of positive affect.
In terms of social processes, expressive suppression has been shown to exert negative effects on important social outcomes, perhaps because it prevents people from accurately communicating affective states or because it may be at odds with cultural values pertaining to open emotional expression. Experimental and longitudinal studies have documented a wide range of disrupted social processes resulting from expressive suppression, including decreased social responsiveness and rapport, lower levels of perceived authenticity, and lower social support and social satisfaction.
Response modulation and resilience.
Given the profile of short-term consequences, one would expect the use of expressive suppression to be associated, on average, with decreased resilience, and empirical data support this prediction. For example, a meta-analysis reveals that the habitual use of expressive suppression is associated with symptoms of psychopathology, including depression, anxiety, and eating disorders. Fewer studies to date have examined expressive suppression specifically following adversity. However, a handful of studies have reported positive relationships between expressive suppression and symptoms of depression and anxiety following adversity, including discrimination and trauma.
While it is clear that expressive suppression has negative effects on resilience in many situations, these negative effects may be attenuated, absent, or even reversed in some contexts. In particular, there is accumulating evidence that one’s culture and specific cultural values moderate the relationship between expressive suppression and resilience. For example, a meta-analysis supports that expressive suppression may have a detrimental effect on resilience in individuals with Western cultural values but no effect on resilience in individuals with Eastern cultural values. Similarly, a prospective study in a sample of Mexican-origin adolescents found the suppression of negative emotion (but not positive emotion) predicted decreases in anhedonia symptoms of depression. One explanation for these findings is that collectivistic-oriented cultures (e.g., Asian and Mexican), compared with more individualistic-oriented cultures (e.g., European), place a higher value on expressive suppression, especially of negative emotion, perhaps to support interpersonal harmony and social goals.
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ON RESILIENCE
In closing, we discuss key directions for future research on resilience indicated by the integrative affect-regulation framework (see Figure 2). We organize these directions by discussing each of the elements of the framework, namely: affect regulation processes, their short-term consequences, the moderating role of context, and implications for resilience.
Affect-Regulation Processes
It is important to deepen as well as broaden our understanding of affect regulation. Within families of affect regulation, emerging research and theorizing suggest potential additional distinctions that could have crucial implications for resilience. For example, several distinctions within the category of reappraisal have been proposed, including (a) reconstrual (changing how a situation is interpreted) versus repurposing (changing the goals to which one compares the situation), (b) reappraisal aimed at increasing positive affect versus reappraisal aimed at decreasing negative affect, and (c) reappraisal of the situation versus reappraisal of one’s emotional response to it.
It is also important to make distinctions among the processes involved in affect regulation, including identifying the need for affect regulation, selecting an affect-regulation strategy, implementing it, and monitoring its implementation. Each of these processes—identification, selection, implementation success, and monitoring—likely has unique implications for resilience, and empirical work is just beginning to examine and delineate these processes.
There is also a need to broaden the scope of analysis. For instance, more research is needed that focuses on strategies beyond reappraisal and suppression to capture the full range of affect-regulation strategies. In addition, we need to study more complex affect-regulation strategies that do not fit neatly into one affect-regulation family. For example, emotional acceptance, which has been linked to resilience, includes features of attentional deployment (e.g., a focus on the present moment), cognitive change (e.g., reframing one’s affective states in a non-judgmental way), and response modulation (e.g., fully experiencing one’s affective states without attempting to change them).
Finally, it will be critical to better understand the antecedents of affect regulation, including antecedents that are biological (e.g., genes; ), situational (e.g., environmental affordances;, ), and psychological (e.g., beliefs about emotions, personality, self-efficacy, or goals;,, ). The beliefs people hold about their emotions might be especially impactful in that they simultaneously affect multiple aspects of affect regulation. For example, the belief that one can control one’s emotions may shape affect regulation identification, selection, and implementation success. In turn, such antecedents might be promising targets for intervention.
Short-Term Consequences of Affect Regulation
At the level of short-term consequences, more work is needed to comprehensively document the full range of short-term consequences listed in Figure 2 and their implications for resilience. The largest body of research to date has examined the consequences of affect regulation on the experience of affect, often focusing exclusively on negative affect. Yet, examining consequences for positive affect such as joy or hope—independently of negative affect—might be an especially fruitful path to understanding resilience. Beyond negative and positive affect, it will be useful to examine the consequences of affect regulation for discrete emotions. For instance, anger and sadness or excitement and contentment may have distinct implications for resilience. Furthermore, consequences other than affective experience are important in explaining resilience; yet there are still critical gaps in knowledge when it comes to behavior (especially beyond facial expressions), physiology, social processes (e.g., social support, social connectedness), cognitive effort, and engagement (e.g., awareness of, behavioral engagement with, and learning from adversity). Lastly, research is needed that concurrently examines multiple short-term consequences (e.g., affective experience, social processes, and engagement) in order to clarify how profiles of short-term consequences shape resilience.
A second aspect of a deeper understanding of the short-term consequences of affect regulation involves investigating their time course and dynamics. To date, research has heavily focused on mean-level consequences of affect regulation (e.g., how does someone feel after using reappraisal relative to after using suppression?). Yet more complex dynamics of these consequences might play a role in shaping resilience, including variability over time, trajectories over time, and relationships among multiple response systems (; see for discussion). For example, regardless of how someone feels when they first encounter adversity, the rate at which their feelings recover and how they feel over the longer term might play an important role in resilience.
The Context
In our empirical review, we highlighted some of the growing number of studies that have examined the role that context plays in affect regulation and resilience. Yet, much remains to be learned. First, it will be important to more systematically and comprehensively examine features of adversity, including intensity, timing, duration, controllability, globality, and type of adversity, among others. Emerging research on reappraisal highlights the utility of this approach.
For example, some forms of reappraisal in response to discrimination have been shown to be associated with null effects on short-term affective experiences and decreased psychological health, perhaps because they invalidate one’s experiences or undermine one’s values. To gain a more comprehensive understanding of the role of adversity and its particular features, we need more studies that consider and compare presence versus absence of adversity, levels of severity of adversity, and other features of adversity (e.g., ). In addition, we need to more deeply and comprehensively consider features of the broader context, including of people’s culture, society, community, social group membership, and family. Existing evidence illustrates that the broader context—through the affordances, practices, values, and beliefs it engenders—can powerfully shape affect regulation and its links with resilience. There are also likely to be important interactions between the broader context, adversity, and affect regulation in shaping resilience. Yet, empirical research in this area is in its infancy.
Considering context will shift how we conceptualize affect regulation’s role in resilience, moving it away from thinking of affect-regulation strategies as either inherently conducive to or harmful for resilience. Rather, we need to think of affect-regulation strategies as conducive to resilience depending on how flexibly and context-appropriately they are deployed. Several recent developments have begun to capture these aspects of affect regulation, including by considering affect-regulation repertoires, affect-regulation flexibility, within-person variability in affect-regulation use, and fit between affect regulation and context (e.g., ). Considering context also highlights the critical idea that interventions can target both affect regulation and the context as ways to increase resilience. Within the affect-regulation framework, it is especially promising to build on these developments.
Resilience Outcomes
At the level of resilience, it will be important to better understand the degree to which affect regulation has general versus specific effects on facets of resilience. One key question is illustrated by Figure 1. We can ask whether the same processes that help people avoid doing worse than expected (e.g., avoid worse ill-being; see red line in Figure 1) also help people do better than expected (e.g., gain well-being and growth; see green line in Figure 1). Further distinctions that are important to explore involve different domains of psychological health; for example, we need to examine whether anxiety versus depression or hedonic versus eudaimonic well-being are predicted in similar or distinct ways. Lastly, resilience does not just concern psychological functioning but also physical functioning, and a major direction for research is to apply the present framework to physical health. Initial research indicates that likely there is at least some specificity, such that affect regulation that is helpful in one domain might not be helpful, or may even be harmful, in other domains.
Concluding Comment
Human life comes with unavoidable adversity. How we deal with this adversity depends crucially on affect regulation. We offer an integrative affect-regulation framework for resilience, which builds on and integrates the coping and emotion-regulation approaches. This integrative framework broadens and deepens how we understand affect regulation, its consequences, and its embeddedness in context. Ultimately, the affect-regulation framework has the promise to guide the development and improvement of prevention and intervention efforts by suggesting precisely which aspects of affect regulation might be of use and in what contexts. This consideration of context also means that, in addition to helping with individual affect regulation, interventions should target how people relate to their context as well as provide educational, occupational, financial, and structural resources to ultimately enhance resilience at the individual, family, and community levels. Our hope is that the affect-regulation framework provides a research agenda for researchers to gain a better understanding of resilience and how we can enhance it.
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