Lightweight and Efficient Protocol Based on ECDH for Securing Smart Grid Communication Infrastructure

The smart electricity distribution network, known as Smart Grid (SG), represents an optimal and intelligent framework for electricity generation and distribution, facilitated through a bidirectional information and communication network. However, setting up such an expansive network presents considerable network security challenges. Consequently, numerous threats such as impersonation attacks, repeat attacks, and man-in-the-middle attacks can pose the network with substantial difficulties. To address security and privacy concerns in SG, researchers have proposed several security protocols intending to increase protection, but exchanging information in a public channel that does not have security conditions poses serious security risks. Despite numerous security protocols having been suggested to facilitate the authentication of network entities and the generation of session keys for ensuring secure communication, some of them have security flaws or high computational overhead that makes them unsuitable for resource-constrained components. This paper presents a lightweight protocol to address the security challenges in smart grid networks. The proposed scheme incorporates a multi-level authentication mechanism and the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) technique to ensure the secure generation of session keys. The security of the proposed protocol has been formally verified using the AVISPA simulation tool and further validated through informal analysis against various attacks. Performance evaluation results demonstrate that the protocol is computationally efficient and well-suited to the resource-constrained environment of smart grid entities. Specifically, the session key generation process is more efficient compared to several existing approaches, thereby minimizing communication delays and enhancing the overall operational performance of the system.

Abstract licence: CC BY-NC-ND

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