Skip to content
naulon
Not checkedNot checked for notices yet.

A Game-Theoretic Approach for Increasing Resource Utilization in Edge Computing Enabled Internet of Things

Sumit Kumar, Ruchir Gupta, K. Lakshmanan and 1 more

IEEE Access · 2022

doi:10.1109/access.2022.3175850 (opens in a new tab)

We email you when a new notice or a question about this paper appears.

Abstract

<italic>Edge computing</italic> is a new paradigm that reduces latency and saves bandwidth by deploying edge servers in different geographic locations. This technology plays a crucial role in the rapidly growing app market for IoT devices as app vendors can hire computing resources on edge servers to serve their app users. An effective allocation of edge computing resources to different apps is needed to maximize resource utilization and serve the most app users at the lowest cost. We refer to this as an Edge Resource Allocation (ERA) problem. In this paper, we propose an Edge Resource Allocation Game (ERAGame), a game-theoretic approach that formulates the ERA problem by appropriately pricing the multi-tenant edge servers. The proposed approach gives a Pure Nash Equilibrium (PNE) solution to the ERA problem. For this, we design an ERA algorithm using ERAGame under which the system converges to PNE. For fast convergence to PNE, the edge servers are partitioned into different groups, enabling the ERA algorithm to run in parallel on all edge servers within each group. We prove that ERAGame is a potential game that guarantees at least one PNE under the ERA algorithm. We evaluate that the price of stability of ERAGame is at most <inline-formula> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">$O (log~n)$ </tex-math></inline-formula>. The performance of the proposed algorithm is examined through simulation.

Abstract licence: CC BY-NC-ND

Reads

Read by people on this page

None yet.

Checked or read by AI through naulon

None yet.

A person counts once a day per paper. We keep no cookie and no address: a reader is a hash that changes every day. Any month under five reads shows no number.

Are you an author?

Is this your paper?

Claim it to add your note and be paid when agents cite it. Free.