Stackelberg-Game-Based Mechanism for Opportunistic Data Offloading Using Moving Vehicles

Data offloading through vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) is one of the most promising methods for overcoming the overload problem in cellular networks. As data delivery by service providers consumes resources such as bandwidth, storage and power, the incentive scheme with the optimal pricing strategy must be identified. In the literature, most incentive schemes focus on offloading through fixed nodes, such as roadside units (RSUs). It remains very challenging to motivate a moving vehicle to help other users deliver their data due to the high mobility of vehicles. Game theory is a widely adopted method for analyzing pricing issues in wireless networks. Therefore, this paper proposes an optimal pricing strategy that uses the Stackelberg game to model the interaction between a service provider and a service requester. Then, the Stackelberg equilibrium is derived under the corresponding conditions. Next, an algorithm is proposed for selecting the service provider that offers the lowest price based on the results of the Stackelberg equilibrium. Finally, the simulation results demonstrate that the proposed algorithm can effectively reduce the downloading time of a task while maximizing the utilities of both the service provider and the requester.

Abstract licence: CC BY-NC-ND

A person counts once a day per paper. We keep no cookie and no address: a reader is a hash that changes every day. Any month under five reads shows no number.