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Analytic of B2C E - Commerce Credit Mechanism Mixed Strategy Risk Behavior Based on Logical Game Petri Nets

Wei Liu, Xin Feng, Fuxin Zhang and 2 more

IEEE Access · 2018

doi:10.1109/access.2018.2838765 (opens in a new tab)

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Abstract

B2C is a commercial retail model of e-commerce for selling products and services directly to consumers. To solve the credit risk issues in B2C e-commerce, in this paper, a credit risk game mechanism is proposed based on game theory and logical Petri nets theory. First, by combining logical Petri nets with game theory, a theoretical modeling method called the logical game Petri nets is proposed. To characterize the utility that each body gained during the competition processes using the least square method, utility functions that describe the relationships between enterprises in different business modes are derived; next, a logical game Petri net model to specify the interactions among different bodies in the enterprise competition module is constructed. To analyze the behavior of the competition module, a reachable marking graph for this logical game Petri net model is established. According to this reachable graph, a utility matrix is subsequently designed to obtain the maximum expected utility for the bodies; finally, through analysis of the logical game Petri nets model for the enterprise competition module, the local optimal utility, as well as the global optimal utility of the individuals and groups, can be guaranteed.

Abstract licence: CC BY-NC-ND

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