An Authenticated Key Agreement Scheme Based on Cyclic Automorphism Subgroups of Random Orders

Group-based cryptography is viewed as a modern cryptographic candidate solution to blocking quantum computer attacks, and key exchange protocols on the Internet are one of the primitives to ensure the security of communication. In 2016 Habeeb et al proposed a “textbook” key exchange protocol based on the semidirect product of two groups, which is insecure for use in real-world applications. In this paper, after discarding the unnecessary disguising notion of semidirect product in the protocol, we establish a simplified yet enhanced authenticated key agreement scheme based on cyclic automorphism subgroups of random orders by making hybrid use of certificates and symmetric-key encryption as challenge-and-responses in the public-key setting. Its passive security is formally analyzed, which is relative to the cryptographic hardness assumption of a computational number-theoretic problem. Cryptanalysis of this scheme shows that it is secure against the intruder-in-the-middle attack even in the worst case of compromising the signatures, and provides explicit key confirmation to both parties.

Abstract licence: CC BY

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