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The evolutionary game analysis of cross-regional ecological compensation - based on the perspective of the main functional area

He-si PAN, Hong-zhi LIU

E3S Web of Conferences · 2018

doi:10.1051/e3sconf/20185304043 (opens in a new tab)

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Abstract

Under the new normal, the carrying capacity of ecological environment in China has reached or approached the upper limit. The root cause is the lack of an endogenous mechanism for the protection and compensation of forest resources. Therefore, clarifying the game relationship between stakeholders can help to break through the dilemma. An evolutionary game model between beneficiary regions and the protected regions was constructed, based on the “restraint-encouragement” mechanism of the central government.The results show that in cross-regional ecological compensation, the optimal strategy of “ protectioncompensation” depend on the net profits of local governments and the central government's fines.

Abstract licence: CC BY

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