Financial incentives often fail to reconcile agricultural productivity and pro-conservation behavior
Andrew Reid Bell, O. Sarobidy Rakotonarivo, Apurva Bhargava and 5 more
Communications Earth & Environment · 2023
doi:10.1038/s43247-023-00689-6 (opens in a new tab)
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Abstract
A series of dynamic games built around collective action dilemmas in conservation suggest that payments to encourage conservation often fail to jointly improve agricultural production and environmental outcomes, but are more successful in more educated and gender diverse groups.
Abstract licence: CC BY-NC-ND
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