Empirical failures of the claim that autistic people lack a theory of mind.

1Most of us have a theory of mind in that we can guess what others are thinking and how that might differ from what we are thinking. Those with autism can be thought of as mindblind in that they cannot imagine what others might be thinking, or even that others are thinking. … To them, it would be like looking at the headlights of a car to determine why the car just did what it did, or what information it is trying to convey to us.

2The assertion that autistic1 people lack a theory of mind—that they fail to understand that other people have a mind or that they themselves have a mind—pervades psychology. The assertion is taught across a wide range of psychology textbooks. The assertion is argued by psychologists in state and federal court cases. The assertion is promoted by thousands of psychology articles; in fact, the vast majority—over 75%—of the top 500 articles indexed by Google Scholar (for “theory of mind” and “autism”) simply assert that autistic people lack a theory of mind rather than provide original data to buttress the claim.2 Clearly, the assertion that autistic people lack a theory of mind has become one of psychology’s sacred topics, a critical evaluation of which the current special issue solicited.

3In this article, we review empirical evidence that fails to support the claim that autistic people are uniquely impaired, much less that all autistic people are universally impaired, on theory-of-mind tasks. We highlight seminal theory-of-mind findings that have failed to replicate. We document multiple instances in which various theory-of-mind tasks fail to converge and fail to predict autistic traits, social interaction, and empathy. We summarize a large body of data, collected by researchers working outside the theory-of-mind rubric, that fail to support assertions made by researchers working inside the theory-of-mind rubric. We conclude that the claim that autistic people lack a theory of mind is empirically questionable and societally harmful.

4For nearly two decades, Simon Baron-Cohen and his colleagues claimed that poor performance on theory-of-mind tasks uniquely characterized autistic people (see Table 1).The initial claim was staked on autistic children’s performance on a theory-of-mind task called False Belief. In a False Belief task, a child might be introduced to two puppets, one named Sally and the other Anne. The child watches as the Sally puppet places a possession, such as a marble, inside a basket. Then, the Sally puppet is taken away, and the Anne puppet moves the marble from its previous location to another location, such as inside a box. When the Sally puppet is represented, the child is asked orally, “Where will Sally look for her marble?” If the child answers with the location where the marble actually is, rather than the location where the first puppet placed the marble, the child is considered to have failed the False Belief task and to lack a theory of mind.

5Other tasks have been used to assess theory of mind; some of the more popular ones appear in Table 2. But it was autistic children’s performance on False Belief tasks that propelled Baron-Cohen and his colleagues’ claim that autistic people uniquely lack a theory of mind.

6However, autistic children are not unique in failing False Belief tasks; so too do children with specific language impaiiment; Down syndrome; Williams syndrome; Prader Willi syndrome; cerebral palsy; Fragile X; epilepsy; and neurofibromatosis type I, as well as children exposed prenatally to maternal smoking and drinking. Indeed, the more atypical the child, the more likely they are to fail false belief tasks.

7Even typically developing children with fewer rather than more siblings, with lower rather than higher socioeconomic status, or with fewer rather than more adult relatives living nearby are more likely to fail False Belief tasks, as are children who are blind or deaf/hard of hearing.

8More recently, Baron-Cohen has acknowledged that a lack of theory of mind “may not be specific” to autistic people (, p. 70;, p. 169). For nearly 30 years, other researchers have also tried to correct this inaccurate claim. But the erroneous claim that only autistic people, “together with robots and chimpanzees” lack a theory of mind (, p. 62; see also ) and are therefore “biologically set apart from the rest of humanity in lacking the basic machinery” (, p. 73) echoes throughout psychological literature, practice, and instruction (cf.;; ).

9A lack of a theory of mind is often assumed to be not only a unique characteristic of autistic people, but also a universal characteristic of all autistic people. Repeatedly, Baron-Cohen has claimed that “mindblindness … is universal in applying to all individuals on the autistic spectrum” (, p. 61;, p. 113;, p. 70;, p. 169;, p. 40;, p. 629; see also Table 3). This assumed universality has been widely promoted across psychology, as the opening quote of our article illustrates. However, as other authors note, many autistic children and adults pass theory-of-mind tasks; therefore, these other authors rightly argue that “mindblindness” cannot be a universal characteristic of autism (e.g.,;;;;;; ).

10Why do some autistic participants pass theory-of-mind tasks while others do not? Numerous researchers have aptly noted that theory-of-mind tasks rely heavily on spoken language (see, and, for reviews). For example, nearly half the variance in participants’ performance on False Belief tasks can be predicted by their spoken language comprehension; nearly three fourths can be predicted by their facility with vocabulary and appreciation of grammar. In longitudinal studies, vocabulary predicts False Belief performance more powerfully than age; in studies comparing autistic to nonautistic participants, vocabulary predicts False Belief performance more powerfully than whether the participants are autistic (;; see also, meta-analysis with over 100 studies of typically developing children;, meta-analysis with 40 studies of autistic children; and, for studies published after these meta-analyses).

11Other theory-of-mind tasks also draw heavily on spoken language. Strange Stories task (see Table 2) requires comprehending complex stories and answering complex questions, which is why complex language comprehension can be the task’s “only” predictor (, p. 183), and vocabulary can account for more than three fourths of the variance (; see also;;;;;;; ).

12Even performance on Reading-the-Mind-in-the-Eyes task “involves sophisticated vocabulary” (, p. 1095), which is why the best predictor of Reading-the-Mind-in-the-Eyes can be Speaking-Aloud-Hard-to-Pronounce-Words and why vocabulary and grammar can account for nearly half the variance (; see also;;;;; ).

13Because theory-of-mind tasks rely heavily on “fairly complex language” (, p. 608) and because autism, by diagnostic definition, involves communication impairment, it is unsurprising that autistic participants with communication impairment perform less well than nonautistic participants without communication impairment. And because autistic people vary in their communication impairment, it is unsurprising that autistic people vary in their theory-of-mind task performance.

14The heavy reliance of theory-of-mind tasks on language has led theory-of-mind proponents to claim that autistic people who pass theory-of-mind tasks must be using their linguistic abilities to “hack out” the answers (, p. 853;, p. 185). This claim might seem superficially sound, but it is hard to reconcile with the fact that autistic people, on average, have communication impairments. How and why would autistic people preferentially use language to “hack out” the answers while nonautistic people, without communication impairments, do not? A related claim made by those who assume that all autistic people must lack a theory of mind, is that autistic people who pass theory-of-mind tasks must use some unknown “logic” or post hoc “strategy” (, p. 868;, p. 110;, p. 130,, p. 220). But such post hoc claims seem to fail their own test of logic.3

15Reproducibility is the cornerstone of science, as psychology’s current focus on replication illustrates. However, when tests of reproducibility are applied to claims about autism and theory of mind, the seminal findings frequently fail.

16For example, cognizant of the heavy reliance on language by most theory-of-mind tasks, designed a nonverbal task. Children were given a scrambled set of four pictures and told to arrange the pictures in a coherent order. One set of pictures displayed a boy standing at the top of a hill with a basketball-sized rock next to his foot; another picture displayed the boy with his foot close to the rock, as though ready to kick it; another picture displayed the rock halfway down the hill; and another picture displayed the rock at the bottom of the hill. deemed this type of picture sequence “mechanical,” and autistic children were almost perfect in sequencing such pictures. Oddly, typically developing children performed below 50% correct on these “mechanical” pictures—which most likely was unexpected because Baron-Cohen et al. (, p. 116) deemed these “mechanical” pictures “the simplest.”

17Another set of pictures displayed a boy sitting on the ground holding an ice cream cone to his mouth with a girl standing nearby; in another picture, the ice-cream-holding boy is looking at the girl who, in this picture, is also sitting on the ground; in another, the girl is reaching for the boy’s ice cream cone while he stretches his arm as far as possible away from the girl’s reach; in the final picture, the girl holds the ice cream cone to her mouth, while the boy rubs his eyes. Autistic and typically developing children were equally adept at arranging this type of picture sequence, which Baron-Cohen et al. (, p. 115) deemed “behavioral” and, quite curiously, not an assay of the characters’ intentions or requiring an understanding of “mental states.”

18An example of the last type of picture sequence displayed a girl holding a teddy bear in her arms, while a flower extends from the ground beside her; in another picture, the girl is turned completely to one side and is holding the flower’s stem, while the teddy bear is on the ground behind her; in another, the girl is holding the flower to her nose, while a boy, standing behind the girl, reaches for the teddy bear on the ground; in the final picture, the girl is turned around, there’s no boy or teddy bear, and the girl’s mouth is wide open. Baron-Cohen et al. (, p. 116, 224) deemed this picture sequence “intentional,” and the typically developing children, who performed so shockingly poorly on the “simplest” mechanical pictures performed nearly perfectly on these pictures, whereas the autistic children performed poorly. Baron-Cohen et al. (, p. 113) used these data to claim that “a specific cognitive deficit … prevents the development of a ‘theory of mind’ in the autistic child.”

19Four research teams, of whom we are aware, have published attempts to directly replicate these results—and none could do so. Using the same stimuli, procedures, and analyses, no other research team has replicated the finding that autistic participants perform significantly worse than typically developing participants on the “intentional” picture sequences (“there were no group differences on the intentional subtest of the picture sequencing measure,”, p. 1093; “contrary to … previous findings, [the intentional condition of the Picture Sequence Task] … failed to reveal significant differences,”, p. 122; “no two groups were significantly different [on the Intentional picture sequence],”, p. 46; “The [autistic] participants were close to ceiling … on the intentional Picture Sequencing items,”, p. 286).

20Not only does seminal theory-of-mind study fail to replicate, but its initially reported effect size, d = −1.714, looms unusually large. In contrast, its replications’ pooled effect size is normatively tiny, d = −0.039, with a confidence interval (CI) that easily overlaps zero (i.e., 99.9% CI [−0.690, 0.611], giving us 99.9% confidence that the true effect includes zero). We are also unaware of any published studies that have replicated Baron-Cohen et al.’s (, pp. 116, 224) report that typically developing participants are dramatically worse on the “simplest” mechanical picture sequences than on the “fairly difficult” intentional picture sequences (cf.; ).

21Similarly, ’s seminal study reporting that autistic participants are prone to fail first-order False Belief tasks (see Table 2) is also prone to fail replication (e.g., “No statistically significant difference between groups were found in the test of first-order theory of mind … These findings suggest that the theory of mind model has its limitations in explaining autism,”, pp. 761, 759; “the children with autism did not underperform on this task,”, p. 236; “Contrary to … previous findings … [the replication] failed to reveal significant differences,”, p. 122; “these were not statistically significant differences,”, p. 7; “no differences emerged,”, p. 2045; “[the replication’s] findings … are not consistent with … previous reports,”, p. 1011; see also ).

22Likewise, report that autistic participants are prone to fail second-order False Belief tasks (see Table 2) is also prone to fail replication (e.g., “No group differences were found in performance on the control or test questions,”, p. 577; “was no difference between normal and autistic children’s performance,”, p. 907; “no significant association between group membership and proportion of items passed,”, p. 885; “our findings are inconsistent with early studies of False Belief abilities in autism,”, p. 85; “The present findings contradict the claims of proponents of … the theory of mind … hypothesis of autism,”, p. 53).

23Furthermore, report that autistic participants who pass first- or second-order False Belief tasks nonetheless fail an “advanced test of theory of mind” (Strange Stories) has also failed at replication (e.g., “counter to our expectations, no group differences were found on any of the stories,”, p. 632; “no group differences in … the Strange Stories,”, p. 884; “In line with prior findings by, no performance differences … were observed in the [Strange Stories task],”, p. 466; see also;;;;;;; ). In fact, the pooled effect size of over a dozen systematically reviewed direct replications not only overlaps zero (d = −0.229, 99.9% CI [−0.479, 0.021]), but also fails to overlap the pooled effect size of the seminal studies (d = −1.696, 99.9% CI [−0.932, −2.460]).

24Perhaps the failure of these seminal studies to replicate derives from their small sample sizes. Samples two to three times larger are needed to reliably test the somewhat obvious hypothesis that people who like spicy food are more likely to report liking Indian food or that people who like eggs are more likely to report eating egg salad. Even reliably testing the hypothesis that men weigh more than women requires samples more than thrice the size of those collected in many of Baron-Cohen’s seminal theory-of-mind studies (e.g., autistic participants N = 10,; N = 15,;; N = 16,;; N = 17,; N = 20,,; N = 21, ).

25Despite these seminal studies’ precariously small sample sizes and their lack of replication, their grander claims continue to rebound through textbooks and scholarly literature, within and outside of psychology, and they ricochet through public vernacular. The robustness of these claims, if not the robustness of their supporting evidence, could well have deterred other researchers from publishing conflicting results.

26Several tasks have been proposed to assess theory of mind, as Table 2 illustrates. However, in more recent studies, many with quite large samples of autistic and nonautistic participants, these tasks fail to converge. These repeated failures of convergence seriously question the tasks’ validity.

27For example, performance on Strange Stories task fails to correlate significantly with performance on Reading-the-Mind-in-the-Eyes task (N = 123 nonautistic adults,; N = 100 autistic children,; N = 90 autistic adolescents,; N = 89 autistic and 89 nonautistic adults,; N = 61 autistic and 32 nonautistic adults,; N = 60 nonautistic adolescents and 60 nonautistic adults,; N = 53 nonautistic adults,; N = 50 nonautistic adults,; see also;;;;;; ).4 In fact, the average correlation between performance on the Strange Stories task and the Reading-the-Mind-in-the-Eyes task, weighted across 27 systematically reviewed samples, is only 0.089, with a CI that overlaps zero (i.e., 99.9% CI [ −.001,.178]).5

28Similarly, the Strange Stories task fails to correlate significantly with the Animated Triangles task (N = 100 autistic children,; N = 90 autistic adolescents,; N = 89 autistic and 89 nonautistic adults,; N = 80 nonautistic adults,; see also ). The Strange Stories task also fails to correlate significantly with the Faux Pas task (N = 123 nonautistic adults,; N = 61 autistic and 32 nonautistic participants, ), particularly when language comprehension is controlled.

29Reading-the-Mind-in-the-Eyes fails to correlate significantly with (a) the Faux Pas task (N = 123 nonautistic adults,; N = 80 nonautistic adults,; N = 70 nonautistic adults,; N = 61 autistic and 32 nonautistic adults,; N = 53 nonautistic adults,; N = 50 nonautistic adults, ), (b) the Animated Triangles task (N = 70 nonautistic adults,; ), (c) False Belief task (N = 100 autistic participants,; N = 90 autistic adolescents,; see also ), and (d) with other theory-of-mind tasks (e.g., the Hinting task, N = 134 nonautistic adults,; N = 73 nonautistic adults,; N = 50 nonautistic adults, ).

30Even False Belief tasks can fail to correlate significantly with each other (e.g.,;; ). The lack of convergent validity among theory-of-mind tasks undermines the core construct validity of theory of mind.

31If theory-of-mind tasks assay “the basic machinery for social engagement” (, p. 73), then performance on theory-of-mind tasks should predict socioemotional function. But numerous studies document failures of prediction. For example, performance on theory-of-mind tasks fails to significantly predict autistic traits in either autistic or nonautistic participants, as measured by clinicians’ observation, self-report, or informant-report (N = 1513 nonautistic adults,; N = 638 nonautistic children,; N = 395 autistic adults,; N = 220 nonautistic adults,; N = 206 nonautistic men,; N = 194 autistic and 60 nonautistic children,; N = 178 autistic men, 168 nonautistic women, and 152 nonautistic men,; N = 108 nonautistic adults,; N = 100 autistic adolescents,; N = 100 autistic adolescents,; N = 89 autistic and 89 nonautistic adults,; N = 79 nonautistic women,; N = 56 autistic children,; see similar results with smaller samples in;;;;; )empathy and emotional understanding (N = 484 nonautistic adults,; N = 395 autistic adults,; N = 342 nonautistic adolescents,; N = 220 nonautistic adults,; N = 200 nonautistic adults,; N = 178 autistic men, 168 nonautistic women, and 152 nonautistic men,; N = 162 nonautistic adults,; N = 121 nonautistic adolescents and adults,; N = 108 nonautistic adults,; N = 89 autistic and 89 nonautistic adults,; N = 58 nonautistic children,; N = 53 nonautistic adults,; see similar results with smaller samples in;;; )everyday social skills (N = 398 nonautistic children,; N = 164 and 140 nonautistic adults,; N = 124 nonautistic adolescents,; N = 101 nonautistic children,; N = 97 nonautistic children,; N = 65 nonautistic children,; N = 63 nonautistic adults,; N = 60 nonautistic children,; N = 53 nonautistic adults,; N = 50 nonautistic adults,; see similar results with smaller samples of autistic children and adults in;; 6;;;;;; and smaller samples of nonautistic children and adults in;;; )social attention, cooperation, anticipation, persuasion, deception, and avoidance (N = 402 nonautistic adolescents,; N = 77 autistic children,; see similar results with smaller samples of autistic children in;;;; and smaller samples of nonautistic children in; );peer relations and pro-social behavior (N = 263 nonautistic children,; N = 128 nonautistic children,; N = 115 nonautistic children,; N = 115 nonautistic girls and N = 115 nonautistic boys,; N = 51 nonautistic children,; see similar results with smaller samples of autistic and nonautistic children, adolescents, and adults in;;; ).

32autistic traits in either autistic or nonautistic participants, as measured by clinicians’ observation, self-report, or informant-report (N = 1513 nonautistic adults,; N = 638 nonautistic children,; N = 395 autistic adults,; N = 220 nonautistic adults,; N = 206 nonautistic men,; N = 194 autistic and 60 nonautistic children,; N = 178 autistic men, 168 nonautistic women, and 152 nonautistic men,; N = 108 nonautistic adults,; N = 100 autistic adolescents,; N = 100 autistic adolescents,; N = 89 autistic and 89 nonautistic adults,; N = 79 nonautistic women,; N = 56 autistic children,; see similar results with smaller samples in;;;;; )

33empathy and emotional understanding (N = 484 nonautistic adults,; N = 395 autistic adults,; N = 342 nonautistic adolescents,; N = 220 nonautistic adults,; N = 200 nonautistic adults,; N = 178 autistic men, 168 nonautistic women, and 152 nonautistic men,; N = 162 nonautistic adults,; N = 121 nonautistic adolescents and adults,; N = 108 nonautistic adults,; N = 89 autistic and 89 nonautistic adults,; N = 58 nonautistic children,; N = 53 nonautistic adults,; see similar results with smaller samples in;;; )

34everyday social skills (N = 398 nonautistic children,; N = 164 and 140 nonautistic adults,; N = 124 nonautistic adolescents,; N = 101 nonautistic children,; N = 97 nonautistic children,; N = 65 nonautistic children,; N = 63 nonautistic adults,; N = 60 nonautistic children,; N = 53 nonautistic adults,; N = 50 nonautistic adults,; see similar results with smaller samples of autistic children and adults in;; 6;;;;;; and smaller samples of nonautistic children and adults in;;; )

35social attention, cooperation, anticipation, persuasion, deception, and avoidance (N = 402 nonautistic adolescents,; N = 77 autistic children,; see similar results with smaller samples of autistic children in;;;; and smaller samples of nonautistic children in; );

36peer relations and pro-social behavior (N = 263 nonautistic children,; N = 128 nonautistic children,; N = 115 nonautistic children,; N = 115 nonautistic girls and N = 115 nonautistic boys,; N = 51 nonautistic children,; see similar results with smaller samples of autistic and nonautistic children, adolescents, and adults in;;; ).

37Indeed, when Baron-Cohen and his colleagues applied machine learning to categorize a large sample (N = 395) of autistic adults into those who perform better versus worse on a theory-of-mind task, the researchers were unable to identify any variable that patterned with theory-of-mind performance “including sex/gender, age, depression or anxiety symptoms, autistic traits, trait empathy, and autism symptom severity” (, p. 2). The only characteristic that reliably patterned with theory-of-mind performance was language dexterity.

38Finally, if theory-of-mind tasks truly assay the ability to infer other people’s “intentions, goals and desires” (, p. 381), and if autistic people lack a theory of mind, then autistic people should fare poorly at inferring other people’s intentions, goals, and desires. But, as Table 4 illustrates, autistic people of all ages skillfully understand other persons’ intentions, goals, and desires. This large body of data, collected by researchers working outside the theory-of-mind rubric, demonstrates another failure of the claim that autistic people lack a theory of mind.

39In this article, we have demonstrated how the claim that autistic people lack a theory of mind fails empirically; it fails in its specificity, universality, replicability, convergent validity, and predictive validity. Despite these numerous empirical failures, the claim pervades psychology and well beyond. It is embraced by scholars in philosophy, sociology, economics, anthropology, robotics, and narratology (;: ). It colors contemporary entertainment (e.g., The Good Doctor, ), and it headlines informational websites. It has spawned unusual speculations, evoking metaphysical, psychoanalytic, and neurochemical explanations.

40The claim that autistic people lack a theory of mind is so entrenched that when existing measures fail to support the claim, researchers create new measures. For example, Baron-Cohen and his colleagues motivated the need for a new theory-of-mind task by claiming that autistic adults must “have a selective theory of mind … deficit,” even though existing theory-of-mind tests “are not subtle enough to detect [that] deficit” (, p. 189). suggest, as do we, that “the development of advanced tests [is] a post hoc response in finding data anomalous to the theory of mind hypothesis” (p. 229; i.e., data that do not support the claim that autistic people lack a theory of mind).

41The development of more and more theory-of-mind tests resembles a methodological arms race. The deployment of first-order False Belief tasks escalates to second-order False Belief tasks, which escalate to the so-called advanced theory-of-mind tasks (Strange Stories, Reading-the-Mind-in-the-Eyes, and Animated Triangles) and then to the Strange Stories Film task, the Comic Strip task, and the Beauty Contest task—all in pursuit of finding a task to support the claim that autistic people lack a theory of mind, when previous tasks fail to support the claim.

42Most recently, “implicit” theory-of-mind tasks have been developed (;;; but see, and, for difficulties replicating measures of implicit theory of mind). As note, researchers and their deployment of increasingly “advanced tests have turned … logic on its head.” The drive to create more and more theory-of-mind tasks “seem to be premised on the assumption” that autistic people lack a theory of mind; therefore, “tests which do not reveal this must be insensitive or unsuitable” (p. 229).

43There has even been a move toward asking nonautistic parents to gauge their autistic offspring’s theory of mind, which is problematic for at least two reasons. First, as autistic scholars have explained (e.g., ) and as empirical data demonstrate (e.g., ), nonautistic people are often as disadvantaged when trying to understand autistic people as vice versa. refers to this dilemma as the “double empathy problem” (see also ), which Loftis (, p. 10) illustrates with the following conundrum: “If autistics truly have a deficit in [theory of mind], then why is it that neurotypicals find it so difficult to intuit the intentions of autistic people”?

44Second, most everyone misjudges their own theory-of-mind performance. For example, an improbable eight out of 10 U.S. college students rate their own theory-of-mind ability as better-than-average (in contrast, a more probable half rate as more logically average their public speaking ability, social self-confidence, computer skills, physical health, emotional health, creativity, and propensity for risk taking, ). Thus, it is unlikely that nonautistic parents can accurately assess their own, let alone their autistic offspring’s, theory-of-mind abilities. As even the creators of a child’s version of Reading-the-Mind-in-the-Eyes task admit, “it is unknown what the child [in the stimulus photographs] was actually feeling” because the stimulus photographs “were all derived from naturalistic settings (e.g., taken by parents) rather than being posed specifically for an experiment” (, p. 2746).

45Some researchers willingly admit that we do not know what theory of mind is, much less how to measure it. Despite this uncertainty, other researchers claim with certainty that “autism is a clear illustration of what human life would be like if one lacked a theory of mind” (, p. 266).

46For example, philosopher David Livingstone Smith (, p. 172) claims that autistic people “live in a world in which nothing has a mind” and “perceive [other] people as hunks of flesh moving mindlessly through space.” Developmental psychologist Alison Gopnik ventures even further, graphically describing how she envisions autistic people perceive other people: Around me bags of skin are draped over chairs, and stuffed into pieces of cloth, they shift and protrude in unexpected ways. … Two dark spots near the top of them swivel restlessly back and forth. A hole beneath the spots fills with food and from it comes a stream of noises. Imagine that the noisy skin-bags suddenly moved toward you, and their noises grew loud, and you had no idea why, no way of explaining them or predicting what they would do next. (Gopnik as quoted in, pp. 4–5;, pp. 312–313; and, p. 172)

47Around me bags of skin are draped over chairs, and stuffed into pieces of cloth, they shift and protrude in unexpected ways. … Two dark spots near the top of them swivel restlessly back and forth. A hole beneath the spots fills with food and from it comes a stream of noises. Imagine that the noisy skin-bags suddenly moved toward you, and their noises grew loud, and you had no idea why, no way of explaining them or predicting what they would do next. (Gopnik as quoted in, pp. 4–5;, pp. 312–313; and, p. 172)

48Along with the stigma promulgated by such renditions, the claim that autistic people lack a theory of mind causes societal harm. Because a lack of theory of mind is believed to impair autistic people’s understanding of their selves, in addition to their understanding of others, the claim disputes autistic people’s autonomy, devalues their self-determination, and discredits their credibility. Consequently, numerous autistic authors have decried the claim, reporting that it “perpetuates stereotypes and oversimplifications [with] the potential for tremendous harm”; that it has already “harmed … countless autistic individuals”; and that “its continued perpetuation will continue to be damaging to autistic people”. We, therefore, call for considerably greater caution before endorsing the claim that autistic people lack a theory of mind.